

# ARGONAUTA

---



---

**The Newsletter of The Canadian Nautical Research Society /  
Société canadienne pour la recherche nautique**

Volume XXXVI Number 2 Spring 2019

# ARGONAUTA

Founded 1984 by Kenneth MacKenzie  
ISSN No. 2291-5427

## Editors

Isabel Campbell and Colleen McKee  
Winston (Kip) Scoville ~ Production/Distribution Manager

## Argonauta Editorial Office

e-mail submissions to:

[scmckee@magma.ca](mailto:scmckee@magma.ca)

or

[Isabel.Campbell@forces.gc.ca](mailto:Isabel.Campbell@forces.gc.ca)

ARGONAUTA is published four times a year—Winter, Spring, Summer and Autumn

Chair of the Editorial Board: Roger Sarty  
Editor The Northern Mariner/ William Glover  
Le marin du nord:  
Webmaster: Paul Adamthwaite

## Executive Officers

President: Richard Gimblett  
1<sup>st</sup> Vice President: Walter Lewis  
2<sup>nd</sup> Vice President: Faye Kert  
Treasurer: Errolyn Humphreys  
Secretary: Michael Moir  
Membership Secretary: Sam McLean  
Councillor/Communications: Kip Scoville  
Councillor: Richard Goette  
Councillor: Tom Malcomson  
Councillor: David More  
Councillor: Jeff Noakes  
Councillor: Margaret Schotte  
Councillor: Ian Yeates

## Membership Business:

P.O. Box 34029 Station B, Ottawa, Ontario, K2J 4B1, Canada  
e-mail: [sam.mclean@cnrs-scrn.org](mailto:sam.mclean@cnrs-scrn.org)

Annual Membership including four issues of ARGONAUTA  
and four issues of THE NORTHERN MARINER/LE MARIN DU NORD:

	<u>Canadian</u>	<u>International</u>	<u>Digital Only</u>	
Individual	\$70	\$80	\$30	Benefactor \$250
Institutional	\$95	\$105	n/a	Corporate \$500
Student	\$35	\$35	\$35	Patron \$1000 or above
NASOH	n/a	n/a	\$30	

Our Website: <http://www.cnrs-scrn.org>

Copyright © CNRS/SCRN and all original copyright holders



## **In this issue of the *Argonauta***

Editorial	<a href="#">1</a>
President's Corner	<a href="#">3</a>
The 'Walter' U-Boat Conspiracy	<a href="#">5</a>
Keith Matthews Book Awards for books published in 2018	<a href="#">28</a>
CNRS 2019 Conference Update	<a href="#">29</a>
Book Review: Lady Franklin of Russell Square	<a href="#">30</a>
Draft Minutes of Council Meeting - 9 March 2019	<a href="#">32</a>
Comparative Balance Sheet	<a href="#">36</a>
Comparative Income Statement	<a href="#">37</a>
Membership Report Part II: Responses on Member Benefits and Attractions	<a href="#">38</a>
Guidelines for Authors	<a href="#">41</a>
CNRS Registration Form	<a href="#">42</a>

# Editorial

by Isabel Campbell / Colleen McKee



## **Pieces in this issue**

In this spring issue, we welcome Derek Waller's thoroughly researched article on "The 'Walter' U-Boat Conspiracy. The British and the Americans versus the Russians." His controversial interpretation should be of interest to international naval scholars of the Second World War and of the early Cold War.

At the request of Faye Kert, who regretted that *The Northern Mariner/Le marinier du Nord*, (*TNM*) did not include reviews of fiction, we commissioned historian Philip Goldring to review Erika Behrisch Elce's novel *Lady Franklin of Russell Square*. Professor Elce is also doing a reading from this historical fiction at the reception of the forthcoming CNRS conference in Thunder Bay Ontario and the review of her work appears in this issue.

What do these two pieces have in common? Perhaps at first glance, not much, but both represent valuable scholarship that does not fit into the standard academic specialist mandate of peer-reviewed publications, like *TNM*. We think *Argonauta* fills an important role, creating a welcoming space for communication among authors, historians, museum people, new scholars, retired military, naval, scientific, and other professionals, practicing archivists, sailors and all those interested in the field of historical nautical matters. It supports inter-disciplinary studies and also serves to alert members of future challenges for the Society.

## **President's Corner**

President Richard Gimblett draws your attention to several new priorities. The Society conferences have long been a rich source for *The Northern Mariner*, *Le Marin du Nord*, but this peer-reviewed, specialist journal now needs your support. *TNM* needs a new editorial team, steady, high calibre submissions, and timely peer reviewers. It is something of a miracle that the journal has been able to survive so well on strictly volunteer staff. Now that the journal is available on the web for free, it is more vital than ever that the membership offers their many and varied skills to ensure that the publication continues. Send in your research notes and articles for publication; become a peer reviewer or suggest the names of potential reviewers; and remember to submit your dues. We encourage everyone to read Rich's piece and consider volunteering.

## **Argo and our plans for renewal**

The editors of *Argonauta* are also anticipating a new editorial team to take over in the next year or two. An infusion of fresh ideas and new personnel will ensure that *Argo* remains relevant. And we already have a talented and interested candidate in mind. Stay tuned for more news on our future editorial team.

When we began editing *Argonauta* in 2010, the publication been in print and mailed to members for over 26 years. A vital communication tool for CNRS members, *Argonauta* included interesting research articles along with announcements, minutes, and other matters vital to the Society. In 2010, we re-sized and re-formatted it to mail out with *TNM* which saved about \$1900 in

annual costs as a first step. In 2012, we transformed the publication into two pdf formats: one to allow for easy e-mailing and one for a higher quality pdf to be placed on the CNRS website for free downloading to the public. This second step saved \$1200 per year for the Society.

While *Argonauta* is not formally part of any double-blind peer review process, every piece we publish is carefully reviewed and edited by both editors. As our contributors will attest, we insist upon careful and accurate endnotes to support all research. The editorial process means submitted articles are passed back and forth between the author and editors, repeatedly if necessary, before publication. We are proud of our authors and what they have published over the past decade and we also appreciate the feedback we have received from members over the years.

In early 2013, we published a debate on the future of maritime history, bringing in prestigious international maritime historians. Later, family members of Canadian northerners wrote articles ranging from Willy Pullen's hilarious anecdotes about the prestigious Pullen family to Doreen Larsen Riedel's carefully researched articles about her father's northern voyages. Other members have contributed memorial pieces on Halifax harbour, telecommunications developments, naval and maritime innovations, and naval war art. *Argonauta* does not compete with *TNM*, a specialist academic publication. We try to support it as much as possible by referring authors back and forth between the two publications when they've submitted to the wrong one.

*Argo's* production manager, Kip Scoville, updates the Society's Twitter and Facebook accounts in cooperation with Sam McLean. This process allows important communications that are short and time sensitive to be shared quickly. So *Argonauta* is evolving. We are especially indebted to Kip who came on board in the autumn of 2013 as our production manager. His contribution has been invaluable; he provides important technical knowledge, expert formatting, and as mentioned, manages the Society's social media. Kip is willing to continue as production and distribution manager for our publication and will be key to providing continuity for the new editorial team. On the personal level, he is very enjoyable to work with.

We see exciting things ahead for *Argonauta* and hope you will continue to send in your work and read this publication.

### ***The CNRS Conference, Thunder Bay, August 22-24 2019***

Michael Moir and Chris Madsen have organized another great conference, drawing together a host of inter-disciplinary research papers. See the conference update and the draft Executive minutes from March 2019 (in this issue) for important information about the forthcoming conference. As the organizers extended the deadline for submissions until 1 April, we have decided to run the abstracts and biographies of speakers in the summer issue which should be e-mailed to you in early July. Mark your calendars and plan to attend. This issue also contains a call for submissions to the Keith Matthews Book Award, and some other news items for your interest. We hope you enjoy reading it all.

*Fair winds*, Isabel and Colleen

# President's Corner

by Richard Gimblett  
richard.gimblett@me.com



In early March, I had the great pleasure to chair the annual winter meeting of Council in what proved to be a fairly momentous day. The formal minutes prepared by Secretary Michael Moir appear elsewhere in this number, which I recommend for your review as an accurate recording of the discussion and decisions. But I believe it is useful to expand upon a couple of items of particular import.

First is the state of our financial house, which necessarily sets the context for what the Society can and cannot do to progress our mandate of encouraging the study of nautical history by and about Canadians. As you will see reflected in the statements prepared by Treasurer Errolyn Humphreys (attached to the minutes), I am delighted to report that we are in a strong and apparently improving position, with some \$38,000 in the bank, and 2018 showing a net increase of some \$2500 over 2017. The recorded difference is actually more than \$7500, but approximately \$5000 soon will be taken off for the printing and distribution of the last two numbers of the journal for last year.

Although it was only a short time ago that Chris Madsen was expressing his deep concern in this very space about money matters, I cannot take credit for this turn around, as my turn in the barrel has been too brief for radical change. Errolyn and I are working to determine whether this is a blip or a trend, but I take my hat off to my predecessors along with the successive production managers of the journal for getting a grip on our finances. They have left the Society in strong enough shape that Council felt confident to take two important steps that speak directly to our mandate: one is to re-introduce a cash award for the Jacques Cartier (Master's thesis) Prize; and the other is to consider a new membership category for "Early Career Researchers" for persons struggling to find full-time employ at a rate between the one set for Students and the one for Individuals.

Second is that Membership Secretary Sam McLean reports a strong showing on renewals, confirming our hope that the Membership has taken in stride the change to open access for the journal. Admittedly relatively few of you have opted for the digital-only membership (meaning the preference remains for a print journal), and many more of you have yet to send in your cheques. But he also advised that some lapsed members, when advised of the digital format, have returned to the fold — welcome back!

The third point is less welcome but quite understandable — Bill Glover has confirmed that he must step down as editor of *The Northern Mariner / Le Marin du nord* when the final number of the 2018 volume appears in a couple of months. Longtime members will recall that Bill was the editor from 2001 to 2006. Four years ago, I was Chair of the Editorial Board when Roger Sarty and Paul Adamthwaite who replaced him were finding the demands of personal circumstances were making it difficult to produce the journal in a timely fashion. Bill graciously offered to reprise the role, starting with the January 2016 number, for an interim period of 3-5 years while a search could be undertaken for a new permanent editor. The search continues, but Bill finds the time has come for him to move on again. He has stepped up to the plate at critical junctures twice. The Society owes him our gratitude and I will find a way to recognize him appropriately at the coming Conference in Thunder Bay.

Coincidentally, I am reminded that Isabel Campbell and Colleen McKee are in their 10th year as editors of this superb publication, and have indicated that they too would like to pass the baton. Thankfully, the circumstances are slightly different, in that they plan to turn things over next summer and report no want of material.

What this suggests is an opportunity to re-think both of our publications in a holistic manner, and I seek input from you the Members on this — what do you want in your journals?, and as a corollary to that, what do you perceive as the needs of the broader community, that would make us an attractive venue with which to publish, and an inducement to join the Society?

Is there still a need for a separate peer-reviewed academic journal of note, or does that need no longer exist? If it does exist, has the distinction between the two become small enough that they can be recombined into a single “publication” in a throwback to the original format of *Argonauta* as it was for the first half-dozen years of the Society? I put that last use of the word in quotes to underscore the question — does the nature of digital presentation encourage taking some different direction?

One model could be the posting of articles on-line as they arrive, to be collected into a printable volume perhaps only once or twice a year, while “news” items be kept on a separate page to be posted as they arrive rather than being disseminated quarterly. Should we change the mix of articles, with peer reviewed pieces presumably still being the goal, but with allowance for research notes, especially works-in-progress from graduate students and our broad following of avocational historians.

Book reviews presumably will continue as a mainstay, but can they have a stand-alone site? Do you want the Society’s website to become a repository for reproducing rare or overlooked documents (that is, items that don’t appear elsewhere), covered with an introductory note drawing attention to them?

You will see some of these ideas listed in the Council Minutes, and of course the final format largely will be at the discretion of the eventual editor(s), who inevitably will imprint their own style. For the meantime, while we gather and reflect upon your feedback — and the search continues — the editorial function for *TNM* will be performed by a few of us on Council with suitable experience, working in collaboration. We have agreed to exercise a fair bit of experimentation, in part because that is suggested by the readily-available content and we want the 2019 “numbers” to appear in short order. But also we have agreed to try different things to see what “sticks”. As Bill himself allowed over a very agreeable recent luncheon I had with him, “if the present model was working, we wouldn’t be having this conversation.”

Richard H. Gimblett, MSC, CD, PhD, RCN (ret’d)  
President  
CNRSPresident@cnrs-scrn.org

# The 'Walter' U-Boat Conspiracy

## The British and the Americans versus the Russians

by Air Commodore Derek Waller, RAF (Rtd)

---

### Introduction

At the end of the war in Europe in May 1945, 156 U-boats surrendered, but not a single one surrendered either to Russian forces or in a Russian-controlled port. The Potsdam Agreement signed on 2 August 1945 included the decision to allocate 30 of these U-boats, 10 to each of the three Allies, for technical assessment and experimental purposes. This led to the creation of the Tripartite Naval Commission (TNC) which was charged with determining which 10 U-boats were to be allocated to each of the three countries (UK, USA and USSR). Amongst the U-Boats which had surrendered were two Type XVIIIB 'Walter' U-boats, *U-1406* and *U-1407*, and in October 1945 the TNC recommended that *U-1406* should be allocated to the USA and *U-1407* should be allocated to the UK. Thus none were available for allocation to the Russians.

A total of nine 'Walter' U-boats had been built for the Kriegsmarine, of which seven were commissioned. There were four Type XVIIIs, comprising two Wa 201s (*U-792* and *U-793*) built by Blohm and Voss (B & V) in Hamburg, and two Wk 202s (*U-794* and *U-795*) built by Germaniawerft in Kiel. *U-792* and *U-794* were commissioned in November 1943, and *U-793* and *U-795* were commissioned in April 1944, and all four were intended for experimental purposes only.

There were also five Type XVIIIBs, all of which were built by B & V in Hamburg, all of which were intended for operational use. *U-1405* was commissioned in December 1944, *U-1406* in February 1945 and *U-1407* in March 1945. Construction on the other two (*U-1408* and *U-1409*) was abandoned in March 1945 before they were completed, and both then suffered bomb damage during an air attack on the B & V shipyard on 8 April 1945.

Eight of these U-boats were powered by an air-independent 'Walter' gas turbine using high-test peroxide (HTP) as its fuel, which enabled them to achieve higher under-water speeds than conventionally powered submarines. The remaining one, *U-794*, was powered by a closed-cycle oxygen plant, though this was not realised until after it had been found post-war.

Though intended for wartime operations, *U-1405*, *U-1406* and *U-1407* were still engaged in their working-up trials as the end of the war approached. *U-1406* had only used its 'Walter' unit once (at a speed of 12 knots) and *U-1407* had not used its 'Walter' unit at all. During April 1945 all three of these Type XVIIIB U-boats were carrying out trials in the Kiel area, and towards the end of the month they were located at Rendsburg to the north of Kiel. After that, *U-1406* and *U-1407* transferred to Cuxhaven via the Kiel Canal, and *U-1405* returned to Kiel to have its schnorkel fitted.

The British and Americans had known about the development of the small high-tech 'Walter' U-boats, with their high underwater speed, before the end of the war, and began searching for these nine U-boats and their development facilities as soon as hostilities ceased. The aim was to organise the allocation of one Type XVIIIB U-boat to each of the Royal Navy and the US Navy for research purposes, whilst at the same time denying access to the technology to the Russians.

This article will explain the circumstances which led to their acquisition by the RN and the USN, including the exclusion of the Russians from the discussions and decisions, thus quite deliberately preventing the latter from acquiring any of the 'Walter' Type XVII or XVIIIB U-boats. It will also discuss the use to which the US Navy and Royal Navy put *U-1406* and *U-1407* after their carefully orchestrated acquisition.

## **The Royal Navy Requirement for a Type XVIIIB U-Boat**

The idea of the Royal Navy conducting trials on captured U-boats had first been considered in 1944, culminating in a letter from Admiral George Creasy, who was Admiral (Submarines), to the Secretary of the Admiralty on 15 October 1944 titled '*Types of German U-Boats Required for Post War Experiments and Tests*'. This revealed that the Royal Navy already possessed a great deal of intelligence about the various U-boat types operated by and being developed for the Kriegsmarine, and stated that:

*A close study of the characteristics of all German U-Boat construction will be of great value, and to this end it is proposed ... that a certain number of each type shall be taken over by the Navy for this purpose. From both an operational and experimental point of view the Type XXI U-Boat is of the greatest importance, followed by the Type XXIII. (1)*

This proposal, which was made well before the war had ended, before any U-boats had surrendered, and before it had been decided that the Allies would retain only 10 U-boats each, was modified by Admiral Creasy on 7 March 1945, when he added the HTP-powered 'Walter' U-boats to his list, saying that:

*Since that letter [of 15 October 1944] was written, fresh information has been received of newer types of U-Boat than the Type XXI and XXIII ... (Types XVII and XXVI). Admiral (Submarines) considers that numbers of these and any other new types will be required to at least the same scale [one in commission and one for spares] as for the Type XXIII. (1)*

By the time the war in Europe ended, the Royal Navy's First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, and the other members of the UK and US Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) had become very suspicious of the Russians and their future intentions, and one of the principles adopted by the CCS was that, if possible, no advanced German technology should be allowed to go to Russia. Indeed, the First Sea Lord took specific action to ensure that advanced U-boat technology should remain firmly in British and American hands. Thus, despite the tri-national nature of the Potsdam Agreement, the British were determined (behind the backs of the Russians) to facilitate the earliest possible acquisition and study of the latest types of high-speed German U-boat, especially the newly-developed, HTP-powered 'Walter' Type XVIIIB.

## **The US Navy's Type XVIIIB U-Boat Acquisition Policy**

The question of what should happen to the German fleet at the end of the war had also exercised the US Navy throughout 1944 and in the first few months of 1945 as part of its post-war planning process, early evidence of which was a letter from Admiral Ernest King, the US Navy's Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), to Admiral Harold Stark, the Commander of US Naval Forces in Europe (ComNavEu), on 24 May 1944. This letter from the CNO was titled '*German Submarines for the United States*', and it spelt out just what the US Navy required, viz:

*Because of their value in research and development and in order to provide for operational test employment in the Western Pacific, it is desired to obtain actual physical possession of certain submarines of the United States' share with minimum delay. It is important that these submarines be of the latest type and that they should be in the best obtainable operating condition, fully armed and equipped, and with maximum spares parts and munitions, particularly torpedoes. (2)*

US policy was then further articulated on 23 November 1944 by the submission to the European Advisory Commission (EAC) of a '*US Draft Directive on Disposition of German and German Controlled Naval Craft, Equipment and Facilities*' (EAC/44/34), which included a significant proposal concerning the future of the German Navy's U-boats, viz:

Para 8:- You [any one of the three Allied Commanders-in-Chief] will safeguard for ultimate disposition by the Control Council all such German ... naval craft ... mentioned in para 6 [above] as you determine to be of new or experimental design, or which you consider merit special examination, or which the accredited representatives of either of the other two Allied Commanders-in-Chief may designate for retention as experimental or new types. (3)

By May 1945, the idea that the US Navy should obtain and conduct trials on captured U-boats had been a US agenda item for well over a year, having been based on intelligence information possessed by the US Navy concerning the various new types of high-technology U-boats operated by and being developed for the Kriegsmarine. It was therefore not surprising when, in response to an invitation from the British Admiralty in April 1945 concerning which types of U-boat should be sought after the German surrender, ComNavEu advised on 4 May 1945 that:

*The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations has indicated the requirements of the United States Navy for German U-Boats, which should be retained for experimental purposes, as follows:*

*Two of each type: VIIC/42, IXC, IXD, IXD2, XB, XIV, XVII, XXI, XXIII, XXVI.*

*In addition, two each of any further types which show promise for experiments and tests ... are required. (1)*

This update (wish list) of the US Navy's 24 May 1944 statement of requirements was, like that of the Royal Navy, made just before the war had formally ended, before any U-boats had surrendered, and before it had been agreed that the Allies would retain only 10 U-boats each. The eventual requirement was therefore modified in terms of U-boat types and numbers both by events and Allied policy.

### **The US Naval Missions in Europe - NavTecMisEu and SubMisEu**

In support of the US intention to take the maximum possible advantage of German naval technology, the US Navy's CNO had announced on 26 December 1944 that:

*On 4 December 1944 the Secretary of the Navy approved the establishing of a US Naval Technical Mission in Europe (NavTecMisEu), with the following mission and task:*

*Mission To exploit German science and technology for the benefit of the Navy Department Technical Bureaus and the Co-ordinator of Research and Development.*

*Task To co-ordinate all the United States Naval activities engaged on the continent of Europe in exploiting German scientific and technological intelligence. (4)*

NavTecMisEu, which was located in Paris, was activated on 20 January 1945, to be followed - as far as the search for specific German U-boats was concerned - in the spring of 1945 by a parallel, smaller and more secretive US Navy organisation called the US Submarine Mission in Europe (SubMisEu). The express purpose of SubMisEu was to implement the CNO's U-boat acquisition policy as set out in his letter of 24 May 1944, and to locate and take back to the United States for study some of the high-technology German U-boats that had been identified by the US Navy's Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), particularly the Type XXI and the Type XVIIIB.

The SubMisEu was the key organisation specifically involved with the acquisition of examples of the Type XVIIIB U-boats that the US Navy was so keen to acquire. The detailed SubMisEu organisation grew directly from the concept which had been expressed in the CNO's letter of 25 May 1944 that:

*It is desired to obtain actual physical possession of certain submarines of the United States' share with minimum delay. (2)*

Clearly time would be short and speed would be necessary if the US Navy's requirements were to be met, and to ensure there were no unnecessary delays in implementing the CNO's U-boat acquisition policy, the formation of the SubMisEu was approved by the CNO in March 1945. Initially only a small team was formed, but after VE Day it was rapidly expanded. SubMisEu was not formally part of NavTecMisEu, but it worked very closely with the larger and more general organisation in view of the latter's responsibility for the co-ordination of all intelligence-led US Navy activities in Europe.

The expanded SubMisEu was activated on 17 May 1945, and was almost immediately moved to the Royal Navy Base at Lisahally in Northern Ireland, which was one of the two locations in the UK being used for the assembly of surrendered German U-boats, particularly the Type XXIs. However, at the same time, officers from SubMisEu joined their colleagues in NavTecMisEu on the continent of Europe to participate in the search for the HTP-powered Type XVII and XVIIIB 'Walter' U-boats.

### **The Capture of the 'Walterwerke' at Kiel**

The results of all this naval pre-planning meant that the British and American ground forces which were advancing into north-west Germany in 1945 included a special unit (T-Force) which, amongst its many tasks, had been charged by Naval Intelligence with capturing and preserving equipment and facilities connected with the very latest U-boat technology. There was very close liaison between T-Force, NavTecMisEu and SubMisEu, all of which had similar, albeit overlapping, interests in certain of the surviving German U-boats, particularly when it came to locating examples of the Type XVIIIs that were required by both the Royal Navy and the US Navy, ensuring their early availability for the planned assessments and experiments.

The British and the Americans were determined to ensure that, where possible, the 'Walter' submarine technology should be denied to the Russians at the same time that it was being exploited by the Royal Navy and US Navy. Thus, there were two separate, though linked, activities that needed to be undertaken in early May 1945 relating to the Type XVIIIB U-boats. The first was to capture the 'Walterwerke' near Kiel before it could be either sabotaged by its German staff or captured by the Russians, and the second was to locate the 'Walter' U-boats themselves and thus ensure that they remained in British and American rather than Russian custody.

As far as the 'Walterwerke' was concerned, the British and American intelligence staff knew well before the end of the war that gas turbine engines powered by HTP were being developed there for use in U-boats. The capture of the factory and its staff on 5 May 1945, even before any of the formal surrender arrangements had taken effect in the Kiel area, was the result of a carefully pre-planned and orchestrated joint UK/US intelligence-led process.

It was urgent and dangerous work, especially because the British and Americans were worried that the Russians might not halt their westward advance on the east bank of the River Trave, but would attempt to advance to Lubeck, Kiel and the rest of Schleswig-Holstein, and perhaps even into southern Denmark. To counter this possibility, British forces had concentrated on reaching the Baltic coast at Wismar near Lubeck, arriving there on 2 May. At the time of the surrender in north-west Germany at 0001 on 5 May 1945, there was a large area of territory to the north of Lubeck and Hamburg, but to the south of the Danish border, which was not occupied by British troops, and this included Kiel which was some 60 miles to the north of the front-line.

When the surrender of German forces and facilities in the Kiel area came into effect, T-Force was still behind the front-line of the British Army. Elements of T-Force, including the Royal Navy's No. 30 Assault Unit (30AU), took steps to move to Kiel as a matter of urgency. T-Force had a list of

some 150 British and American targets in the Kiel area, of which the most important was the 'Walterwerke' factory, and there was considerable concern that the Russians might attempt a seaborne operation to capture the city. On the other hand, its capture involved travelling through territory that had yet to be occupied by the British Army. Despite the hurdles, T-Force began its move north at 0800 on 5 May, and some three hours later had effectively (though somewhat informally) assumed control of Kiel and accepted the surrender of the German naval forces in the city. At the same time, a team from 30AU made haste to Tannenbergl, just to the north of Kiel and near the eastern entrance of the Kiel Canal, where the 'Walterwerke' factory was located, capturing not only the works intact, but also Dr Helmut Walter and his senior staff.

The 'Walterwerke' was therefore under British and American control, and a message from Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) to the Admiralty on 7 May confirmed that:

*Walter Research Works in Kiel intact. Dr Walter and staff available for interrogation. Development machinery set up for submarine high underwater speed partially complete. (5)*

There was nevertheless a great deal of concern about the security of the project, and this was emphasised in another message on 7 May from the British Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) at the Admiralty in London to the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief Expeditionary Force (ANCXF) in Germany, which said:

*It is requested that the secrecy of Walter-boats Type XVII and XXVI, particularly of the turbine propulsion units, should be preserved and not disclosed except to authorised Anglo-American personnel. This should apply also to component parts, drawings, plans, etc. (5)*

### **The Search for the 'Walter' U-Boats**

This was followed by a further message from the DNI to ANCFX on 21 May, which particularly reflected American concerns, stating that:

*Following received from ComNavEu: Following dispatch received from NavTecMisEu - German submarine units 1405 to 1407 inclusive have Walter propulsion plants of great technical value. Were to have become operational 5 May 1945 and may be at sea or sunk. Request special guarding and notification location if surrendered. ComNavEu please advise Admiralty. Comment: It is reported that these three boats left Kiel on or about 5 May but their subsequent movements were not known. They may have been sunk or scuttled in the Denmark area. (6)*

As a result, ANCFX passed a message to the Royal Navy Flag Officers in Kiel, Denmark and Norway on 22 May, stating:

*U-Boat numbers 1405, 1406 and 1407 at present unlocated are of great technical interest. Immediate notification and special arrangements for guarding are to be made should they surrender. They are reported to have left Kiel about 5 May. They may have been scuttled or sunk in the Denmark area. (6)*

As was already known via ULTRA intercepts, the three operational Type XVIIIB U-boats (U-1405, U-1406 and U-1407) had been in the Rendsburg area near the eastern end of the Kiel Canal in late April 1945 for work with the Torpedo Testing Establishment in Eckernforde, but after that the ULTRA trail went cold due to the fog of war. In fact, U-1405 had returned to Kiel to have its schnorkel fitted, and the other two had left Rendsburg on 1 May and sailed (via the Kiel Canal) to Cuxhaven, where they arrived on 3 May.

This was followed by the surrender agreement with Field Marshal Montgomery's 21<sup>st</sup> Army Group, which came into effect at 0001 on 5 May. It required the German armed forces in north-west Germany, including all naval vessels, and thus the U-boats at Cuxhaven, to lay down their arms and surrender unconditionally. As a result, whilst there were local discussions about the possibility of scuttling the several U-boats that were moored in the harbour at Cuxhaven, their COs were forbidden by the local senior Kriegsmarine officers to scuttle or otherwise sabotage them, being threatened with shooting in the event of disobedience. Indeed, as revealed by an ULTRA intercept, before being instructed to the contrary, the COs of both *U-1406* and *U-1407* had sent a joint message to their HQ in the early morning of 5 May saying:

*We request order to scuttle the Walter front-line boats in the event of seizure by the enemy being imminent. (7)*

Despite this, the surrender arrangements at Cuxhaven were duly completed by the German authorities during 5 May. Thereafter *U-1406* and *U-1407* ceased active duty, and the COs and crews of both these Type XVIIIB U-boats were transferred to one of the fish processing halls (Fischhalle IX) at the Cuxhaven Fishery Port. On 6 May, the then unmanned *U-1406* and *U-1407* were towed to the New Fishery Haven (Neuer Fischereihafen) in Cuxhaven port, where all the surrendered U-boats in the harbour were left in the custody of two motor escort vessels, which had been designated as guard ships. The latter were moored alongside *U-1406* and *U-1407* in order to ensure that no unauthorized personnel should go on board the two U-boats.

However, on the night of 6/7 May, Lt Gerhard Grumpelt, who was an experienced U-boat engineer, and who had been appointed to the Cuxhaven Naval Base after his former appointment as an instructor in the Baltic Submarine Combat Training Group, decided to scuttle the two Type XVIIIB U-boats on his own initiative. He was not a member of the crew of either *U-1406* or *U-1407*, but was temporarily accommodated in one of the guard ships. So, he went on board *U-1406* and *U-1407* and scuttled each of them by opening the main vents and other flooding valves, and leaving the conning tower hatches open, an action for which he was subsequently court martialled, found guilty, and sentenced to imprisonment.

At almost the same time, the British and Americans began their search for the four Type XVII (*U-792*, *U-793*, *U-794* and *U-795*) and five Type XVIIIB (*U-1405*, *U-1406*, *U-1407*, *U-1408* and *U-1409*) U-boats that had been built.

As far as the four Type XVII experimental 'Walter' U-boats were concerned, the Royal Navy and the US Navy had been tracking the movements and activities of *U-792*, *U-793*, *U-794* and *U-795* since late 1943. With respect to *U-792* and *U-793*, they were ordered to transfer to Kiel for paying-off on 16 March 1945, with *U-793* arriving at Kiel on 19 March, and *U-792* arriving at Kiel on 28 March. *U-794* was reported as leaving Warnemunde on 26 March en-route to Kiel, where it entered the naval base on 28 March. Also, *U-795* had been recorded as being de-commissioned and laid-up in Kiel on 23 March 1945. Thus whilst the Western Allies had a good idea that all four of these U-boats were likely to be located in and around Kiel, they had no up-to-date intelligence information as to the precise whereabouts of them as the war ended in early May 1945.

Of the five Type XVIIIB's, it was known that only the first three had been completed and undertaken some trials, but none was formally operational. Construction of the other two had been abandoned before completion in the Blohm & Voss Shipyard in Hamburg, *U-1408* (90%) and *U-1409* (80%), after they had been badly damaged in RAF bombing raids in early April 1945. A report about the state of these two Type XVIIIB U-boats which were found on the slipways in Hamburg written on 13 June 1945 records that:

*Both U-Boats lying well over on their starboard sides. One of them appears to have received a direct hit in the engine room and she is in two pieces [this was U-1409]. Other boat [U-1408] not severely damaged and it is possible to crawl through her. (8)*

These two incomplete and damaged U-boats had been located in the Blohm and Voss Shipyard in early May after the capture of Hamburg, and the prime objective for the UK and US intelligence teams was therefore to find *U-1405*, *U-1406* and *U-1407*. However, their precise locations were unknown, and it was neither a quick nor easy task to find them. The initial search was made by the Royal Navy's Captain Gilbert Roberts, who had been sent to Germany by the C-in-C Western Approaches, Admiral Sir Max Horton.

Captain Roberts' optimistic report to his Commander-in-Chief on 30 May 1945 stated that he had carried out a search for *U-1405*, *U-1406* and *U-1407* on 26 May, and that he had discovered them in the Rendsburg area of the Kiel Canal, all scuttled. As described by Captain Roberts, it had not been an easy search, but it seemed to him to have produced the desired results, viz:

*It has been reported that three U-Boats of this type, which are experimental prototypes of Type XXVI, were ready to be operational and that they were considered satisfactory. Very vague reports placed these three, U-1405, U-1406 and U-1407, in the Kiel Canal, but no German officers knew where they were, or if they did, they evaded reply to questioning.*

*Evidence was pooled to four Interrogators, including Commander Gheradi, USN, at a meeting on 25 May, and it was decided to make a search for these three U-Boats on 26 May. It was felt that even though all details of Walter propulsion were known it was important to see the shape of these U-Boats even though they might be found scuttled.*

*After long and difficult interrogation of local inhabitants in a probability area in the Kiel Canal, these three U-Boats were traced with reasonable certainty to positions as follows:*

*Point 71. Kiel Canal, north bank. Small red buoy marks the spot where the U-Boat is sunk in about 8 fathoms.*

*Point 67. In a backwater off the Kiel Canal near the jetty of a small signal station. Two small red buoys mark the spot where the U-Boat is sunk in about 8 fathoms. Bubbles and a small quantity of oil are rising to the surface, two yards from the southern buoy.*

*Point 64. In the Eiderhaven of Rendsburg town. The top of a conning tower was stated to be just awash, but it was not sighted. This position was not found by ourselves but it had been sighted by a Sgt, RA, in a British Army patrol boat, and local evidence confirmed this.*

*None of the above places were approachable by road or on foot. I commandeered a German "R" boat for search purposes, and used it for two hours. (9)*

Unfortunately, Captain Roberts' information turned out to be totally incorrect, and this caused a certain amount of confusion, adding to the uncertainty as to the location of any to the 'Walter' U-boats. For instance on 3 June, the Royal Navy's Flag Officer Kiel advised ANCXF that:

*U-1405, U-1406 and U-1407 [are] alleged to be sunk in the Kiel Canal [and that] salvage of at least one being investigated. (8)*

However, although this was inaccurate, salvage operations were initiated in the Kiel Canal as a result of Captain Roberts' report, and these produced *U-792* and *U-793*, plus *U-748* which was a Type VIIC U-Boat. The two Type XVII U-boats (*U-792* and *U-793*) were nevertheless recovered, with Flag Officer Kiel advising ANCXF on 13 June that:

*U-792 and one other Type XVII [which turned out to be U-793] had been found in 11 metres of water and that both were holed. U-792 [was at the] the Howaldswerke Shipyard in Kiel,*

[but] *the other was still in the Kiel Canal at Kilometre 66, north of Audorf Signal Station on [the] south bank. (8)*

The same letter from Flag Officer Kiel advised that:

*U-795 had hull and engine damage, and [had been found] ashore at the Germaniawerft Shipyard in Kiel. (8)*

In the meantime the search for the other Type XVII (*U-794*) and the three remaining Type XVIIIBs continued. Conditions in and around the heavily damaged ports and shipyards of north-west Germany were still chaotic in June 1945, and it was not easy to pinpoint the location of just a few specific U-boats, despite all the intense British and American interest in the 'Walter' U-boats, especially the Type XVIIIBs. Thus, in mid-June, ANCXF sent Rear-Admiral Eberhard Godt, who was the ex-Chief of Operations in the U-Boat High Command, on a tour of investigation with the specific task of locating the three missing Type XVIIIB U-boats.

After his tour, Admiral Godt returned to the ex-Kriegsmarine Headquarters at Flensburg and on 24 June reported that, whilst he had been unable to trace *U-1405*, he had located *U-1406* and *U-1407* at Cuxhaven, where they had been scuttled after first surrendering. The results of the Admiral's investigations, as well as the interrogations of the COs of *U-1406* and *U-1407* which took place on 29 June, are recorded in an ANCXF report to the Admiralty dated 12 July 1945, which included the information that:

*[The] Type XVIIIB was the newest and most interesting of the U-Boats in existence at the end of the war. It was known that only three had been completed and had done trials and that none was operational. These three were U-1405, U-1406 and U-1407 and their location has been the subject of continuous enquiry.*

*Early information gave them as scuttled in the Kiel Canal [but this had proved to be incorrect].*

*The actual finding of U-1406 and U-1407 was a direct result of sending Admiral Godt on a tour of investigation.*

*[Admiral Godt] reported ... that he had reliable information that U-1406 and U-1407 were scuttled in the New Fishery Haven, Cuxhaven. He had no knowledge of U-1405.*

*U-1405, U-1406 and U-1407 were in company and carrying out trials during April. Towards the end of that month they were at Rendsburg together. U-1405 returned to Kiel to have [a] schnorkel fitted, and it is the opinion of the [COs] of U-1406 and U-1407 that U-1405 was scuttled either in Kiel or Eckernförde. U-1406 and U-1407 proceeded to Cuxhaven about 1 May and on 3 or 4 May the German Senior Naval Officer at that port sent for the Commanding Officers and made them promise not to scuttle or sabotage their ships.*

*On the night of 7 May ... U-1406 and U-1407 [were] scuttled by opening main vents and certain flooding valves and leaving the conning tower hatch open. No scuttling charges were fitted and no damage was done except by flooding. The two COs admitted removing one or two parts of the Walter Unit before their departure on 4 May.*

*Arrangements have been made for U-1406 and U-1407 to be taken from Cuxhaven to Kiel in order to receive expert assessment and attention preparatory to their departure for United Kingdom.*

*Information has now been received that U-1405 is almost certainly scuttled in Geltinger Bight and steps are being taken to confirm this. If found the vessel will be salvaged and taken to Kiel. (8)*

As a result of receiving this information, two Royal Navy officers, Captain Blake and Commander Sanders, travelled from Flensburg to the New Fishery Haven in Cuxhaven, where they found that arrangements were already underway to start salvage operations on 29 June. Indeed, such was the UK and US interest in these two Type XVIIIB U-boats that *U-1406* and *U-1407* were raised with great haste and moved to the Howaldt-Werke Shipyard in Kiel at the beginning of July 1945, though not before a fire had started in *U-1406* and it had needed to be re-immersed in Cuxhaven harbour.

Despite Admiral Godt's report, the location of *U-1405* remained a mystery. It was known to have been scuttled, but no one was sure where. Thus, when the British Naval Commander-in-Chief Germany passed on ANCXF's instructions on 14 July that all scuttled U-boats in German dockyards, harbours and waters were to be destroyed, and that this work was to be commenced immediately, it included a caveat that:

*Great care is to be taken that U-1406 at Geltingerbucht remains undamaged. (6)*

At the same time as this action was taking place, US Navy officers from NavTecMisEu and SubMisEu were also searching for the Type XVII and Type XVIIIB U-boats, and especially for an example of the Type XVIIIB. They quickly became aware that the British had located *U-1406* and *U-1407* and, on 26 July advised ComNavEu, and through him, the Commander-in-Chief United States Fleet (Cominch) that, in their opinion, just one Type XVIIIB U-boat (*U-1406*) would be sufficient for US Navy research purposes.

As far as the four Type XVII U-boats were concerned, the two that had been found in the Kiel Canal near Rendsburg, *U-792* and *U-793*, had been scuttled by their crews on 4 May and were lying in 11 metres of water, and both were holed. They were nevertheless raised and taken to Kiel: *U-792* on 26 May, and *U-793* on 15 June. Of the other two, *U-794* had been taken from Kiel and scuttled by its crew in Gelting Bay on 5 May, and *U-795* had been blown-up on the slipway on which it had been laid-up in the Germania Werft shipyard in Kiel on 3 May. *U-794* (which did not have an HTP propulsion system) was then located in Gelting Bay and raised, but its hull and machinery had been so seriously damaged by three internal explosions that after a brief inspection it was re-scuttled in the same position.

On 4 and 5 August 1945, Captain L V Honsinger from NavTecMisEu and Commander F Beltz from SubMisEu jointly reviewed what was known about the nine Type XVII and Type XVIIIB U-boats, five of which had by then been assembled on the dockside at Kiel in the British Zone, albeit that four of them had previously been scuttled and then salvaged, and all of which were damaged and non-operational. As a result of their review, and as a clear indication of the American and British intentions to take control of the 'Walter' U-boats behind the backs of the Russians, despite the fact that all decisions about the surviving U-boats were supposed to be made on a tri-national basis, Honsinger and Beltz made the following, slightly confusing, report on 5 August:

*[We] have looked over all XVII U-Boats during past day and a half:*

<i>U-792</i>	<i>Kiel</i>	<i>internally blown - British originally requested</i>
<i>U-793</i>	<i>Kiel</i>	<i>internally blown - worse than above</i>
<i>U-794</i>	<i>Kiel</i>	<i>satisfactory, but closed cycle oxygen plant</i>
<i>U-795</i>	<i>Kiel</i>	<i>school boat - 10 foot hole in Walter engine room</i>
<i>U-1405</i>	<i>Kiel</i>	<i>still sunk in Kiel Canal</i>
<i>U-1406</i>	<i>Kiel</i>	<i>satisfactory - sunk, raised, burned, sunk, raised</i>
<i>U-1407</i>	<i>Kiel</i>	<i>good - but British are taking</i>
<i>U-1408</i>	<i>Hamburg</i>	<i>no good, but can cannibalise</i>
<i>U-1409</i>	<i>Hamburg</i>	<i>blown in two but can cannibalise. (10)</i>

[Author's Note: There is some inconsistency in this list, especially in relation to *U-794* which had been so badly damaged that it was re-sunk after being raised and inspected].

As a result of this review, Captain Honsinger and Commander Beltz drafted a memo and signal message on 5 August which discussed the 'way ahead', especially in respect of U-1406. Captain Honsinger's memo included the information that:

*Most people believe U-1406 is best [for the US Navy]... I think U-795 best. However, have decided no change. Will take U-1406.*

*U-1406 needs everything stripped out of it and then the parts preserved and reinstalled plus a new Walter engine plus a few other missing parts. ... Work of tearing out and preserving to be done by German labour. ... I've started all above work.*

*Commander Beltz and [Commander] Loughan are most anxious for us to have Germans rebuild U-1406 alongside U-1407 per request of British ... I don't agree. I ... think we should be satisfied to take home the Walter machinery only ... and build up from there back home.*  
**(10)**

Commander Beltz's draft message, which was to be sent from NavTecMisEu to Cominch, stated:

*Type XVII submarines with Walter engines U-1406 and U-795 best available to United States. U-1406 now on quay wall at Deutschewerke Kiel was scuttled by Germans and critical elements of regulator, combustion chamber, and switchboard destroyed. When vessel was raised [HTP] fire developed and got beyond control necessitating immersion again. Finally raised after considerable interior damage due to fire and immersion. Hull in excellent condition. U-795 on quay wall at Kiel Germania prototype of XVII used as school boat and experimental depth charging, never flooded or scuttled. Demolition charge in Walter engine room wrecked engine and blew hole 10 feet by 10 feet on port side of engine room. After needs of NavTecMisEu with Type XVII engine for Engineering Experimental Station and British equipments are satisfied it is believed one XVII can be made operational with limited reserve of critical spares. Two alternatives possible. Alternative one - sectionalize for shipboard shipment to States U-1406 or U-795 with all available parts for assembly. Alternative two - in German shipyard, preferably Blohm and Voss builders at Hamburg, demand Germans to place submarine in satisfactory operational condition under United States Naval inspection. Advise desires. **(10)***

Commander Beltz then submitted a comprehensive 'Material Report on U-Boats Under Cognizance of Commander Submarine Mission Europe' to the Commander Submarines, Atlantic Fleet (ComSubLant) on 17 August 1945, which, in relation to the 'Walter Turbine Boats' and reflecting some errors stemming from the obvious confusion of the time, said that:

*There were eight Walter boats built or in the process of being built by Blohm and Voss, Hamburg. The U-792, U-793 and U-795 were built as experimental boats to test out the Walter engine and to be used for training purposes ... The German Admiralty ordered 12 more built, U-1405 to U-1416 as operational boats, [but] after "D" Day and the emphasis on Type XXI boats, construction of Walter boats was only continued on U-1405 to U-1409.*

*U-792, U-793 and U-795 are on the quay wall at Germaniawerft, Kiel. At the time of the German surrender these vessels were wrecked by demolition bombs spotted in the Walter engine room. U-1405, U-1406 and U-1407 were sunk at the entrance of Kiel Canal after critical elements of the Walter engine and its controls had been thrown over the side. U-1408 and U-1409 were in the process of completion on the builders skids at Hamburg. They were also demolished by demolition charges.*

*Hamburg and Kiel are at present in British zone of influence. As consequence the British have made the first demand on all German material in those areas. The British have relinquished rights for the Walter engine on the test stand to United States provided they can participate [in] the tests at Experimental Station, Annapolis. The present tentative plans of the British are to make U-1407 operational at Kiel. Of the remaining Walter boats U-1406 and U-795 appear to be the best.*

*The purpose of this dispatch is to advise Cominch that there are possibilities of obtaining a Walter Type submarine for operational purposes in the United States. . . . We [feel] that the best recourse to assemble an operating submarine would be either at Hamburg, Germany or in the United States. We were advised on account of British political reasons, efforts to place a ship in operating condition at the builders yard, Blohm and Voss, would meet with some resistance.*

*We were informed by the British at Kiel that the British Government was determined that for economic reasons Blohm and Voss would never be allowed to turn over another wheel. We also had information that the Russians who [might] fall heir to the Kiel area have had no information on the Walter engine, as a consequence consideration was being given by United States and the British to evacuate from Kiel all equipment that pertained to the Walter engine and Walter boat and move it on to Hamburg, United Kingdom or United States.*

*If Cominch desires an operating Walter boat, I personally would recommend that we should first investigate the possibility of persuading the British to allow Blohm and Voss to complete one boat to our satisfaction. Failing this proposal, I would recommend that we require Deschimag at Bremen in the American zone of influence to complete one boat. As a last resort I would recommend the assembly of parts of a Walter boat and ship them to United States for assembly at Navy Yard Portsmouth.*

*However I feel if we are to get the full benefits from the Walter design we should utilise the facilities, talent and technique of the Germans and do the job in Germany. This would probably be the quickest and cheapest method of getting an operating Walter boat and would give us the fullest opportunity to evaluate the German technique. (10)*

By early August it was therefore crystal clear, despite any possible Russian aspirations, that *U-1406* had been earmarked for the US Navy and that *U-1407* (the best example) had been earmarked for the Royal Navy. The latter decision owed its genesis to the fact that Kiel was located in the British Zone of northern Germany and that, even though there was the closest possible co-operation and co-ordination between the Royal Naval and US Naval forces in the area, the UK had, by definition, the first choice in respect of all the German material that had been captured when the war ended, a fact that was readily acknowledged by both NavTecMisEu and SubMisEu.

All that then remained to be done was to ensure that these two complete but severely damaged U-boats were formally allocated to the US and the UK, that decisions were taken about where and how they were to be made serviceable, especially as both been scuttled, and that steps were taken to ensure that the remaining Type XVII and Type XVIIIB U-boats were put beyond any prospect of their acquisition by the Russians.

It was originally thought that both *U-1406* and *U-1407* might be repaired and returned to an operational condition in a German shipyard using the local facilities and the experienced labour, but it was quickly realised that this would not be possible. The initial British proposal was to make use of the Blohm and Voss Shipyard in Hamburg, where the two Type XVIIIB U-boats had been built, whilst the Americans were inclined to use the Deschimag Shipyard in Bremen. This approach had been sanctioned at a meeting held in the Admiralty on 17 July 1945 to discuss '*Admiralty Policy concerning the Future of Submarine Design*', when the Chairman, Admiral Sir Frederic Wake-Walker, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Sea Lord and Controller of the Navy, stated that *U-1407* was to be repaired and brought to UK, with all possible work being done in Germany prior to the transfer. (11)

However even this proposal was quickly dismissed for political reasons because the British Government was determined that all the German naval shipyards should never again be used for military purposes. Thus in September the Admiral directed that *U-1407*, as well as a trial Mk 18X 'Walter' power plant which had been found in the factory in Kiel, should be taken to the UK immediately. He also indicated that Vickers at Barrow-in-Furness, in Cumberland, were to be entrusted with the project, since they were the UK's leading submarine building firm.

### **The Tripartite Naval Commission (TNC)**

The TNC obviously had a critical role to play in respect of the 'Walter' Type XVII and XVIIIB U-boats, particularly because the British and Americans were determined to deny their Russian ally access to the '*Walterwerke*' and to ensure that the Russians were not allocated any of the surviving examples, no matter what their serviceability status.

Thus, before the 1<sup>st</sup> Meeting of the TNC on 15 August, both the American and British Admirals (Admiral Robert Ghormley, USN and Admiral Sir Geoffrey Miles, RN), who were their country's Senior TNC Representatives, were issued with clear 'riding instructions' from Washington and London respectively. Admiral Ghormley received a short message on 13 August from the CNO/Cominch, which included the statement that:

*The US desires its proportionate share (10) of the thirty submarines to be preserved. These to be types embodying latest German developments including at least one Type 17B. (12)*

In contrast to the slim-line approach taken by the US Navy, Admiral Miles was given a formal, and detailed, five-page Directive by the Admiralty on 13 August which set out the very hard line that he was to take in relation to the 'Walter' U-boats. It was far more comprehensive than the American instructions, specifically re-emphasising the policy that the Russians were to be denied access to the '*Walterwerke*' in Kiel. The unequivocal Directive to Admiral Miles included the statements that:

*In particular, the Russians are not in any circumstances to be allowed access to the research laboratory, establishments or equipment of the Walterwerke.*

*The disposal of the latest types of U-Boat, fitted with hydrogen peroxide propulsion units, presents a problem of special importance and some difficulty. The most valuable boats are U-1406 and U-1407, which are fitted with the unit type 18X, and are capable of being completed within a reasonably short time. In addition, there are four badly damaged boats fitted with a smaller unit, type 17, namely U-792, U-793, U-794 and U-795.*

*It is desired to exclude the Russians from acquiring any of these special types of U-Boat. The Russians are, however, almost certainly aware of the existence of one or both types, and have a right under the [Potsdam] Protocol to inspect the boats. The exercise of this right, if a request is made, should be permitted, but inspection should be confined to the boats themselves and restricted to the minimum. You should report immediately any enquiries made by the Russians concerning these types [of U-Boat], and pending further instructions your case should be:*

- a. to maintain that U-1406 and U-1407 are the only boats of this type available for disposal within [the] Protocol.*
- b. to insist in concert with your USA colleague, that U-1406 and U-1407 are to be allocated to the USA and UK respectively.*

*The refusal of any of the U-792 to U-795 class to the Russians may be a delicate matter, but has great importance, since the acquisition of one of these boats might lead the Russians to put forward a claim under ... the Protocol to examine and take equipment in the Walterwerke*

*establishments for the purpose of providing spares for the U-Boats to be delivered to them. Further consideration is being given to the question of the disposal of these special types of U-Boat and establishments in relation to the Russians. Meanwhile, you should, if possible, avoid discussing the subject with the Russians. (13)*

At the same time, the British naval authorities in London and Germany were taking specific steps in an attempt to restrict Russian access to the 'Walter' U-boats during the TNC inspection process, and the following exchange of messages is a clear example of the carefully orchestrated 'conspiracy' to exclude the Russians, if at all possible:

RN C-in-C Germany to Admiralty - 6 Aug:

*This U-Boat has now been raised and identified as U-794. Hull and machinery have been seriously damaged by three internal explosions, and it is considered that this submarine which has been re-scuttled in marked position is not worth salvaging. Request approval to demolish this vessel without further examination.*

*U-1405 has not yet been identified. Request I may be informed whether location of this U-Boat is still an urgent requirement. (14)*

Admiralty File Minute - 7 Aug:

*It appears that the requirements of both the Americans and ourselves for U-Boats of the Types to which U-794 and U-1405 belong [Types XVII and XVIIIB] have already been met. It is for consideration, therefore, that subject to the agreement of the Americans, the U-794 should be demolished and the U-1405 should be demolished if found but that the search for her should be given a low priority. (14)*

From Admiralty to RN C-in-C Germany - 9 Aug:

*Instructions for disposal of U-794 will follow in due course. Search for U-1405 should be abandoned. (14)*

From Admiralty to RN C-in-C Germany, copy ComNavEu - 10 Aug:

*Request you make immediate arrangements for towage of U-1406 and U-1407 to UK, reporting dates they will be ready to sail. Crews from UK can be provided. ComNavEu concurrence is being sought. (14)*

From ComNavEu to Admiralty - 11 Aug:

*Do not concur for U-1406 as NavTecMisEu has matter in hand and has made other arrangements. (14)*

From Admiralty to RN C-in-C Germany - 11 Aug:

*In view of ComNavEu's [message] delete U-1406. FOSM is arranging for crew of 3 officers and 15 men for U-1407 to arrive Sheerness by 1000 12 August. C-in-C Nore is requested to arrange for their onward passage to Kiel. (14)*

From RN C-in-C Germany to Admiralty - 12 Aug:

*Request disposal instructions for W [Walter] Type submarines U-792, U-793 and U-795 which are at Kiel with W units sabotaged by explosion. U-795 was released to US Navy by Admiralty*

*on 22 July. It was intended to make use of any serviceable parts of these submarines in connection of refit of U-1407 and provision of spare gear for Type 17 U-Boats. Hull repairs to enable these vessels to be towed were stopped when U-1406 and U-1407 became available. (14)*

From RN C-in-C Germany to Admiralty - 13 Aug:

*Request also disposal instructions for the following experimental U-Boat hulls: U-1408 and U-1409 lying at Blohm and Voss Hamburg damaged by bomb and with principal parts of Walter unit removed. It was intended to use some parts of these submarines for Type 17 spares. (14)*

From FO S/M to Admiralty - 13 Aug:

*Consider all equipment in U-792 and U-793 which may be of service in repairing U-1407 should be removed and sent to UK. No use can be seen for their hulls after U-1407 has safely arrived at her refitting port in UK. (14)*

From FO S/M to Admiralty - 14 Aug:

*Consider any parts referred to in RN C-in-C Germany message of 13 Aug [re U-1408 and U-1409] which may be of use in repairing U-1407 should be sent to UK. (14)*

From Admiralty to RN C-in-C Germany - 17 Aug:

*Any parts of U-792, U-793, U-1408 and U-1409 which may be of use in repairing U-1407 or for spares should be removed and sent to UK as soon as possible. Instructions for destruction of hulls of derelict or incomplete U-Boats in signals under reference, will be issued after report of Tripartite Naval Commission concerning allocation of U-Boats is received. (14)*

From Flag Officer Schleswig Holstein (FOSH) to RN C-in-C Germany - 28 Aug:

*Spare parts will be out of Walter submarines U-792, U-793 and U-795 by noon, Thursday. No definite instructions have yet been received regarding disposal of hulls and remaining machinery. Failing instructions to contrary by noon, Thursday 30<sup>th</sup>, intend to sink hulls in Kiel harbour. In the event questions being asked by members of Tripartite commission intend replying that these submarines have been destroyed with other types in accordance with policy laid down. (14)*

From RN C-in-C Germany to FOSH and Admiralty - 28 Aug:

*Hulls are not repeat not to be sunk unless definite orders to do so are received from Admiralty. Admiralty are requested to signal as a matter of urgency guidance on what Russians should be told about these hulls if they ask and also about disposal of U-1406 and U-1407 in view of [signal of 7 May] re preservation of secrecy of Walter Boats Type XVII. (14)*

Admiralty File Minute - 28 Aug:

*U-792, U-793 and U-795 are so badly damaged by sabotage that they cannot be repaired and completed within six months, and therefore by the terms of the Protocol should not be counted amongst those available for allocation.*

*The Russians have already been told by Admiral Miles that these three U-Boats have been salvaged in a damaged condition. It therefore appears to be out of the question to sink them before the inspection takes place.*

*The Russians also know that U-1406 is in US hands, and that U-1407 is in the United Kingdom.*

*By the terms of the Protocol the Russians have the right to inspect all these ships.*

*In giving guidance to RN C-in-C Germany and FOSH on how to meet the Russian questions about these ships, we cannot add much to the directive already given to Admiral Miles. Indeed, for RN C-in-C Germany to tell a different story would only arouse their suspicions. (14)*

Admiralty to RN C-in-C Germany - 29 Aug:

*Hulls of U-792, U-793 and U-795 should not repeat not be sunk. If Russians ask questions about these vessels, they should be informed that they were scuttled and their machinery sabotaged. It should be pointed out that they are incapable of being completed within the stipulated time. Anything likely to emphasis the importance of these vessels should be avoided, but if the Russians wish to inspect them, para 12 of instructions to Commission should be followed.*

*Russians are aware that U-1406 is in US hands and U-1407 in United Kingdom. Latter will be inspected by their delegation in this country. Admiral Miles has been instructed to insist in concert with the US Representative that these two should be allocated to US and UK respectively. Request inform Admiralty and Admiral Miles of any Russian enquiries about any of these vessels. (14)*

RN C-in-C Germany to Admiralty - 29 Aug:

*There is some evidence that a U-Boat sunk off Eckenforde is U-1405. Request instructions whether demolition should proceed. (14)*

RN C-in-C Germany to FOSH - 29 Aug:

*Unless Admiralty give instructions to the contrary, demolition [of U-1405 sunk in Eckenforde] should proceed. (14)*

RN C-in-C Germany to Admiralty - 3 Sep:

*Can instruction for disposal of U-Boat 794 be given now? (14)*

Admiralty File Minute - 6 Sep:

*RN C-in-C Germany has already reported that after raising the U-794 he considered it not worth salvaging and had re-scuttled her. Admiral Miles was told in his directive that "she was salvaged in a damaged condition", but she does not appear amongst the unseviceable submarines in the agreed list of the Tripartite Naval Commission. It is not likely, therefore, that the Russians know anything about her and in any case there are in existence three other damaged hulls of the same type. There seems, therefore, no reason why she should not be demolished, but it would probably be better to wait until after the Inspections of the Tripartite Commission are over.*

*Admiral Miles was not told of the possible existence of the U-1405 and this vessel also does not appear in the agreed list of the Tripartite Commission, but confirmation of the existence of the third specimen of this class would certainly lead to the Russians claiming her if they came*

*to hear of it. Although she might provide valuable spare parts for the U-1406 and the U-1407, on balance it would seem preferable to demolish her suspected hull without waiting to obtain confirmation of her identity. Propose to inform RN C-in-C Germany. (14)*

Admiralty to RN C-in-C Germany - 8 Sep:

*U-794 should be demolished when inspections of Tripartite Commission are over. Concur in demolition of U-1405. (14)*

Shortly after the receipt of this message on 8 September, a report was received from the Naval Officer i/c Eckernforde confirming the original fate of *U-1405*, details of which had been discovered after a diver who was preparing the wreck for demolition reported that the U-boat was of unusual construction. The original intention had been to scuttle *U-1405* in Gelting Bay but, on 3 May, shortly after the start of its transit north from Kiel it was spotted by two British aircraft, and the CO therefore decided to scuttle it immediately in Eckernforde by exploding three scuttling charges. Finally, and in accordance with the Admiralty's instructions, the wreck of *U-1405* was demolished by a depth charge during September 1945.

In the meantime, and without awaiting agreement from the TNC, the Royal Navy had taken unilateral action to transfer *U-1407* to the UK. After it had been raised in haste on 1 July, it was first towed via the Kiel Canal to the Howaldt-Werke Shipyard in Kiel. Then, at the end of August, it was towed to Sheerness by the ex-Kriegsmarine tug *Fohn 2*, and from there it was towed to the Vickers Shipyard in Barrow-in-Furness by a British ocean-going tug, arriving there in the first week of September 1945 amid considerable secrecy and with zero publicity.

Once it became clear that there was no prospect of *U-1406* being repaired in a German shipyard, and despite the fact that its allocation had not been formally considered by the TNC, the US Navy took steps to move it to the USA just as soon as possible. However, it was not fit either to sail or to be towed to the USA, having already been "*sunk, raised, burned, sunk and raised*". Indeed, there is even doubt that it was ever formally inspected by the TNC's North German Inspection Party.

The first step in the move from Germany to the USA was taken on 21 August when ComNavTecMisEu advised the CNO that *U-1406* had been towed from Kiel to Bremerhaven, and that he expected to ship it to New York in early September. Thus, on 14 September, *U-1406* was loaded onto the US freighter SS *Shoemaker* for transport to the USA as deck cargo, albeit that its destination was changed to Portsmouth Navy Yard.

In respect of *U-1407*, the TNC's Inspection Team visited Barrow and viewed it on 6 September during its tour of the UK. The data sheet that had been prepared by the Royal Navy's liaison officer at Barrow for presentation to the Team made the U-boat's poor condition very clear. Indeed, after the visit to Barrow, the report of the Inspection Team's leader, Rear Admiral Ernest Archer, RN, '*Report of Inspection of German Naval Units in UK*' dated 25 September 1945, recorded that:

*On Thursday 6 September we flew to Barrow to see two submarines there, one of them U-1407 [The other was U-3017]. As regards U-1407 the visit there could not have been better stage managed even if it had been intended to put our visitors [the Russians] off. The boat had not yet been ventilated and stank after her time on the bottom; she had slime all over her interior and the temporary lighting system was earthing onto the hull, so anyone touching it got a shock.*

*In consequence the time spent inside this craft was surprisingly short. The general impression gained was that the Russians knew about the Walter unit, also that they felt cheated inasmuch as they expected us to hide her away, instead of which there she was prominently displayed in our shop window, albeit with a pretty hefty shock for all those who braved her interior. [Captain] Orel [of the Russian Navy] gave us his opinion that as a boat she could be considered scrap, though she might be of some technical interest. (15)*

The TNC Inspection Team's visit to Kiel seems to have gone equally well. After the earlier debate, the thoroughly unserviceable *U-792*, *U-793* and *U-795* were made available for inspection on the quayside, albeit with the proviso that if the Russians asked questions about these U-boats, they were to be informed that they had previously been scuttled and raised, and that their machinery had been sabotaged. They were therefore incapable of being repaired within six months, and anything likely to emphasise the importance of these vessels was to be avoided. However, as later reported by Admiral Miles, the envisaged difficulties with the Russians did not materialise. The Russians in the inspection party showed no overt interest in them, and made no remarks when they viewed *U-792*.

The results of the TNC inspection visits, albeit that *U-1406* was never formally inspected at Bremerhaven, was that *U-1406* and *U-1407*, which were the only 'Walter' U-boats to be included in the TNC's initial 'Agreed List' of U-boats to be inspected, were each graded as Category 'C', which meant, according to the general TNC rules, that they fell into the definition of naval ships which were inoperable or whose construction or repair could not be completed within six months.

The logical implication of this definition was that *U-1406* and *U-1407* should not therefore have been available for allocation, but instead should have been destroyed. Nevertheless, the Russian members of the TNC acquiesced to the British and American desire to be allowed to keep these two thoroughly unserviceable U-boats, neither of which qualified as an 'operable submarine' which was therefore available for allocation.

The remaining Type XVII and XVIIIB U-boats in Germany, *U-794* and *U-1405* had been defined as being 'scuttled in shallow water', and were not included in the TNC allocation process, as were *U-792*, *U-793* and *U-795*. They had however been located and made available for inspection at Kiel, though primarily so that they could be cannibalised by the British and Americans. The implication of the designation 'scuttled in shallow water' was important, because the TNC had agreed that ships sunk in shallow water should be destroyed in such a manner that the possibility of salvage and partial or full use for naval purposes was precluded.

Therefore, of the nine Type XVII and XVIIIB U-boats, only *U-1406* and *U-1407* were, despite their unserviceable condition, candidates for TNC allocation, and these two had (in effect) the Stars and Stripes painted on the side of one and the Union Jack painted on the side of the other. As a result it seems that, for whatever reason, the Russian members of the TNC agreed to their allocation to the USA and UK without demure. Either the secrecy that the Admiralty had requested on 7 May 1945 had been maintained, or more likely the Russians already knew enough about the 'Walter' turbines to satisfy their own needs.

The initial allocations of 10 U-boats to each of the three Allies were formally agreed at the 13<sup>th</sup> meeting of the TNC on 10 October 1945, and the UK list included *U-1407* and the US list included *U-1406*.

The TNC allocation process was not however quite the end of the matter because, just before the TNC signed-off its final report on 6 December, there was an unexpected sting in the tail from the Russians when Mr Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, received a letter from Mr F T Gousev, the Russian Ambassador in London, on 4 December, complaining, amongst other things, but in specific relation to the 'Walter' U-boats, that:

*In addition, the British representatives on the Tripartite Commission supplied no information at the time about the new type of German submarine, Series XVII, with turbine, which, as it proved, was under the control of the British authorities. (16)*

However, Mr Gousev then concluded on an unexpectedly conciliatory note, by saying:

*As, however, the Tripartite Commission's work, which in general has proceeded satisfactorily, is now completed, the Soviet Government feel there is no need to continue discussing the unsatisfactory features of the Commission's work. (16)*

The Foreign Office similarly concluded that it was time to cease this debate, but the Admiralty nevertheless produced a defensive internal response to the Foreign Office on 19 December which emphasised the lengths to which the British and Americans had gone in their attempts to keep the 'Walter' technology to themselves. It emphasised the true extent of the deception exercise by saying that:

*The Russians have referred in the letter of 4 December to the Type XVII submarines, of which, as you know, there are only two in existence [U-1406 and U-1407], and the Americans and ourselves were particularly anxious to secure them for U-research and to keep one apiece without letting the Russians get to know too much about their design and machines. This we have succeeded in doing.*

*Although Admiral Miles did declare them to the Commission at their first meetings, he did so in a supplementary list of inoperable submarines, as their construction was not at that time complete.*

*The Russians, fortunately, did not pay any great attention to them either at Berlin or in the course of the inspections. In view of their unique machinery and value in Naval research, we should like to avoid saying anything at this stage which might provoke the Russians into a further discussion about them. (16)*

One of the great enigmas of the TNC allocation process was how little fuss was made by the Russians about the British and American attitudes regarding the latter's acquisition of the Type XVII HTP-powered 'Walter' U-boats, their turbine engines, the specialist staffs, the drawings and the associated papers. Clearly the Russians knew that the US and UK forces had captured the 'Walterwerke' at Kiel, as well as the shipyards in Hamburg and Kiel, that they had raised, salvaged and inspected all the Type XVII and XVIIIB U-boats that had been built, that they had denied the Russians access to the HPT technology, and that they had insisted that U-1406 and U-1407 should be allocated by the TNC to the USA and UK respectively. Yet, during the latter half of 1945, no Russian difficulties were raised concerning this situation, either within or without the TNC forum.

U-1407 was even transferred to the UK from Germany without Russian permission prior to its inspection by the TNC, yet even when it was inspected at Barrow on 6 September 1945 by the joint UK, USA and USSR team of experts charged with determining the condition of all the surrendered U-boats prior to the formal allocation process, the Russian members of the team took a surprisingly relaxed attitude. The reason for this is that in their advance westwards across Germany, the Red Army had captured the Glückauf Submarine Construction Bureau offices at Blankenburg in the Harz mountains to the west of Dresden, and that amongst the prizes which were discovered in a disused salt mine had been a full-sized mock-up of the Type XXVI ocean-going 'Walter' U-boat which was being designed there. They had also captured a substantial amount of submarine-related materiel and documents including a Mk 17B (2,500 hp) and a Mk 18X (7,500 hp) 'Walter' turbine. Thus, the Russians themselves had acquired access to the secrets of the 'Walter' U-boats, and did not wish to advertise this fact to their British and American allies for fear of demands concerning inspection rights. Maybe they considered that the maintenance of mutual secrecy was the best way forward.

This was also the conclusion reached by Admiral Miles who, in his final report to the Admiralty on 8 November 1945, said that:

*It is interesting to note that the possible difficulties over the Russians and the Walterwerke submarines, expressed in paragraphs 11 and 12 of my directive, did not in fact materialise.*

*The Russian Inspection Parties evinced no interest and neither did Levchenko put in for any when it came to bidding for the ten submarines he was allowed. The small U-792 type was seen by the Inspection Party with no remarks, and this studied silence, I think, can only mean that they have got a selection of blue prints (which they dearly love) from the Walterwerke offices in their sector of Berlin and are frightened of us asking for them. (17)*

Perhaps this accounts for the Russians' surprisingly easy acquiescence to the subsequent UK and US proposal that the only two available, albeit unserviceable Category 'C', Type XVIIIB U-boats should be allocated to Britain and America, an intention which the two Western Allies had made clear well before the TNC had even been constituted.

As far as the two remaining Type XVIIIB U-boats (*U-1408* and *U-1409*) were concerned, their final demise was recorded in a message from the NOIC Hamburg on 30 November 1945 which confirmed that:

*Work has already commenced on the reduction to scrap of the Type XVII U-Boats U-1408 and U-1409 at the yard of Blohm & Voss, Hamburg. (6)*

### **The American and the British Use of the 'Walter' U-Boats**

In the case of the US Navy's interest in *U-1406*, it had been clear since early August 1945 that it was in a very poor state, as was recorded in a message sent from NavTecMisEu to Cominch:

*Type XVIIIB submarine with Walter engine U-1406 now on quay wall Deutsche Werke Kiel was scuttled by [the] Germans and critical elements of regulator, combustion chamber, and switch board destroyed. When vessel was raised, hydrogen peroxide fire developed and got beyond control necessitating immersion again. Finally raised after considerable internal damage, due to fire and immersion. Hull in excellent condition. (10)*

Despite this, a NavTecMisEu report dated 17 August had somewhat optimistically then said, in respect of *U-1406*, that its condition was:

*Satisfactory, [despite having been] sunk, raised, burned, sunk and raised. (10)*

*U-1406* arrived at Portsmouth Navy Yard (PNY) on 11 October 1945, but despite earlier aspirations, the US Navy neither repaired nor operated the U-boat. After a preliminary inspection, PNY estimated that it would cost \$1 million and take 15 months to put it into service. Whilst the US Navy's initial intention was to use *U-1406* as a fast target, its hydrogen peroxide fuel presented a serious fire risk and was very costly and, in any case, it seemed probable that the U-boat's performance was unlikely to achieve the speeds and depths required. Thus, the plans to use it were rejected, and the future of *U-1406* was quickly decided by the US Navy, as is clear from the Minutes of the Submarine Officers Conference held in Washington on 26 March 1946 which said that *U-1406* would not be placed in service, but that the hull would nevertheless be retained.

Instead, the US Navy concentrated on a study of the Mk 17B HTP-powered 'Walter' gas-turbine engine which had been fitted to *U-1406*, of which the US Navy had two examples, one from *U-1406* itself and one which had been found in the 'Walterwerke' at Kiel by the NavTecMisEu and then shipped to the USA. Both of these Mk17 B engines were taken for study to the US Navy's Experimental Engineering Establishment in the Severn River Naval Complex at Annapolis, Maryland. However, whilst at the time the 'Walter' turbine was seen as the most effective means of achieving air-independent, high-speed, underwater propulsion, it was quickly overtaken by the advent of nuclear propulsion, and the US Navy's interest waned.

*U-1406*'s hull therefore remained moored at PNY without any plans for its future use after the decision was made that it would not be placed in service with the US Navy. Then, as a result of the

emerging advantages of nuclear propulsion, as well as the ongoing cost of maintaining *U-1406*'s hull at PNY, BuShips recommended to the CNO on 2 January 1948 that *U-1406* should be declared surplus to the needs of the US Navy and that it should be made available for disposal.

In response, the CNO agreed on 14 January 1948 that *U-1406* was no longer required, and this was formally approved by the Secretary of the Navy on 27 February. The CNO authorised its disposal in February 1948 and it was, as reported in the *New York Times* on 26 March under the headline '*3 Submarines, one a German U-Boat, are offered for sale for use as scrap*', advertised for sale to ship-breakers for scrapping by the US Navy's Vessel Disposal Office at the Naval Shipyard in Brooklyn, New York on 25 March. The bids, which were only open to US citizens, were opened in the Brooklyn Navy Yard on 26 April, and the U-boat was sold to the Interstate Metals Corporation of New York. Finally *U-1406* left Portsmouth under tow on 18 May 1948 en-route to the ship-breakers, and it was broken-up later in the year.

In contrast, the Royal Navy was attracted by the possibility of HTP being an air-independent propulsion option. Thus, after *U-1407* arrived at the Vickers Yard in Barrow under tow and in a generally poor condition in early September 1945, it was allocated Pennant Number N.25 on 25 September 1945, before being formally commissioned as HMS *Meteorite* on 26 August 1947. It was eventually refitted with a new HTP turbine engine, constructed from parts which had been transferred from the '*Walterwerke*' in late 1945. However, the engine needed further repairs and development under the personal supervision of Professor Hellmuth Walter and a small team of German engineers who were taken secretly to Barrow to continue the work that they had started in Kiel.

The Admiralty's intention was that *U-1407* (N.25) was initially to be used experimentally and that, if the trials were successful, a decision would be taken as to its future use as a possible high-speed anti-submarine target for training purposes. The refitting of the submarine was a particularly lengthy business which involved a complete overhaul, with new components brought over from Germany, and a number of other major changes to the original U-boat. These included the fitting of a new escape system, a complete change of the ventilation system, the replacement of all electrical equipment, and the removal of the torpedo tubes.

The Royal Navy's trials with the much-modified *U-1407* (now commissioned as HMS *Meteorite*) did not begin until 1948 when, at the end of January and despite the lack of its HPT turbine plant at that stage, the Royal Navy decided to carry out preliminary 'First of Class' trials off the west coast of Scotland, using just the diesel and electric motors for power. The main object of these trials was to familiarise the crew with the submarine's general handling, and particularly to observe and understand its reaction to the controls, with a view to future high speed trials.

In the meantime, on-shore combustion trials had been taking place with the HTP turbine plant between July and September 1947. However, these revealed flaws in a number of components, and the final set of on-shore trials was not completed until July 1948, after which the HTP turbine was fitted to HMS *Meteorite*. Further surface trials then began but these were not completed until October 1948 due to repeated postponements because of rough weather. The results of these surface trials were very promising. A speed of over 14 knots was obtained and the 'Walter' engine worked very well, despite rough handling.

The main operational trials, both on the surface and submerged, with HMS *Meteorite* took place between 17 March and 30 April 1949. First, it carried out general handling trials and submarine drills, and the next stage comprised a series of initial surface trials of the HTP turbine between 1 and 5 April. The CO reported that during this, and at all later high-speed trials, HMS *Meteorite* handled perfectly. A further series of submerged high-speed trials then took place and once again they were all completely successful.

Despite the changes to the submarine, as well as the optimism concerning its propulsion system and the successful high-speed trials, HMS *Meteorite* was not popular with the Royal Navy crews, who regarded it as a risky piece of machinery. Though the trial results were insufficient to persuade the Royal Navy to keep HMS *Meteorite* in commission, they were sufficiently encouraging for the Admiralty to place an order for two larger British-built experimental HTP-powered submarines, with the original intention - which was not pursued because of the advent of nuclear propulsion - of ordering an operational fleet of up to 12 such submarines.

In mid-1949, HMS *Meteorite* (U-1407) was taken out of service, and the Admiralty announced on 17 June 1949 (just 17 days after the report on HMS *Meteorite*'s operational trials had been submitted) that approval has been given to the scrapping of HMS *Meteorite* after the examination and removal of certain equipment. This was followed by a statement on 16 July 1949 stating that the submarine had been decommissioned on 8 July 1949.

Finally, as was formally recorded in an Admiralty statement dated 15 December 1949, U-1407/HMS *Meteorite* was moved from the Vickers yard at Barrow to the Thomas Ward ship-breaking yard at Barrow on 7 September 1949, and broken up during the remainder of the year.

### **The Russian Exploitation of 'Walter' Technology**

Despite being denied any example of the small, coastal Type XVII and XVIIIB 'Walter' U-boats and their HTP technology, the Russian Navy was still very keen to gain the maximum advantage from the German developments. This involved two specific lines of research.

First, Project 616 was intended to be a Russian copy of the large, ocean-going Type XXVI 'Walter' U-boat, but this line of research was soon abandoned, probably after the captured German documentation and material had been fully analysed. Second, Project 617 was a more independent Russian development implementing both the 'Walter' turbine and numerous innovations gleaned from the other U-boat types. Project 617 resulted in the building of a single submarine, S-99, which was intended to be the prototype for an entire class, but the plan was discarded after S-99 suffered damage from an explosion in May 1959. Despite considerable interest and investment, Project 617 did not lead to further development of any such submarines in the Russian Navy. Instead, like the situation in both the US Navy and the Royal Navy, the prospect of the advent of nuclear power was far more attractive to the Russians than the HTP-related propulsion technology.

In the late 1940s, the Russian Navy's intentions about the exploitation and use of the U-boats in its inventory were difficult to discern, but on 9 May 1947 the US Navy's CNO produced a comprehensive paper, based on intelligence information, giving an '*Estimate of Russian Exploitation of German Submarine Types*'. Most of the US Navy's attention was focussed on the Type XXI U-boats, but the paper also included an assessment concerning the Type XVII and XXVI 'Walter' U-boats. The paper's conclusions about the latter Types were:

*It seems probable that the Russians will construct some type of Walter propelled submarine for test purposes. There is no indication as yet that they will adopt a Type XXVI construction programme, and it seems unlikely that they will do so. All of their activity to date points to investigation and evaluation with a view to use in their own design. (18)*

### **Conclusion**

The British and Americans were aware well before the war in Europe ended of the German development of 'Walter' technology and its application to U-boats, and were determined to ensure, not only that they gained early access to such technology, but also that it should be denied to the Russians.

Fortuitously all nine of the Type XVII and XVIIIB U-boats that had been commissioned had surrendered or been scuttled in the British Zone of Germany in early May 1945, with even the two which formally surrendered (*U-1406* and *U-1407*) then being scuttled in Cuxhaven. Thus, whilst the 'Walterwerke' in Kiel had been captured by British and American intelligence-related staffs before the final capitulation of Germany, it was some time before the 'Walter' U-boats themselves could be located. Immediate action was taken by the British and Americans to try to ensure that their Russian allies were denied any access whatsoever.

All four of the Type XVIIIs had been damaged beyond repair, as had the Type XVIIIB, *U-1405*, and they were not therefore required by either Britain or America. However, although the other two Type XVIIIBs, *U-1406* and *U-1407*, were also in a very poor state after being scuttled, the US Navy and the Royal Navy were determined to obtain them for research purposes. The British and American Admirals on the TNC were instructed to ensure that they procured these two U-boats for their respective navies, whilst at the same time discouraging any possible interest from the Russians.

This action succeeded, and the Russians made no attempts either to obtain any of the 'Walter' U-boats or to create undue difficulties for their British and American allies during the TNC's review activities. It seemed to be that the Russians had also captured and gained access to 'Walter' technology in their eastern Zone, and did not wish to share such secrets with the British and Americans. A diplomatic impasse was therefore avoided, perhaps more by good luck rather than good management.

Finally, whilst the air-independent, HTP-powered, 'Walter' gas turbine was at the time of its use in the Kriegsmarine and during the immediate post-war period thought to be a possible way ahead for submarine propulsion, it was soon to be overtaken by nuclear power in all three navies. Of the nine 'Walter' U-boats, only one, *U-1407*, was ever taken into use, but that was only possible after an extensive and expensive refit by the Royal Navy, and even then it was de-commissioned and scrapped very shortly after its trials were completed.

*Arundel, West Sussex, UK*

*July 2018*

---

#### **Specific Sources:**

1. TNA Kew, ADM 1/16384 - Post-War Experiments and Tests on Captured U-Boats
2. NARA Washington, RG 38.2.3 - Records of the Chief of Naval Operations – COMINCH Ops and the Tripartite Naval Commission (TNC), 1944-1945
3. TNA Kew, ADM 1/16180 - Disarmament of Enemy Naval Services
4. NARA Washington, RG 38.2.4 - Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations - World War II Command File – The US Navy Technical Mission in Europe (NavTecMisEu)
5. TNA Kew, ADM/199/2317 – Admiralty War Diary, 1 to 15 May 1945
6. TNA Kew, ADM 228/2 – British Naval Commander-in-Chief Germany, German U-Boats, Policy for Disposal
7. TNA Kew, HW 18/436 – ULTRA Reports, 1 March to 5 May 1945
8. TNA Kew, ADM 228/8 – British Naval Commander-in-Chief Germany, Reports 1945
9. TNA Kew, ADM 1/17561 – Report from Captain Roberts, RN, on Visit to Germany, May 1945
10. NARA Washington, RG 313 – Records of US Navy Commander Submarines Atlantic (ComSubLant). (RG 313, E275, COMSUBLANT Blue 498 Flag Files, 370/41/12/5-6, Boxes 11-1 and 11-2)

11. TNA Kew, ADM 1/27774 – Hydrogen Peroxide Underwater Propulsion Development, 1945 to 1946
12. NARA Washington, RG 333.4 - Records of the US Navy Element of the Tripartite Naval Commission (TNC) 1945-1947. (RG 333, Entry 15, 190/31/10/01-02, Box 1)
13. TNA Kew, ADM 205/54 – Disposal of Captured Enemy Fleets
14. TNA Kew, ADM 1/18378 – Disposal of Certain German U-Boats: Demolition or Retention for Russian Inspection
15. TNA Kew, ADM 116/5571 – Tripartite Naval Commission (TNC), Disposal of German Vessels in British Hands
16. TNA Kew, ADM 1/18495 – Russian Complaint Concerning UK Representatives on the TNC
17. TNA Kew, ADM 118/5564 – TNC: Report and Recommendations of the Commission on the Allocation of the German Fleet
18. NARA Washington, RG 38.4.3 – Office of Naval Intelligence – Top Secret Reports of Naval Attachés. (RG 38, A1 98-C, 370/14/13/5, Box 15)

## Keith Matthews Book Awards for books published in 2018

---

The Awards Committee is making its annual call for submissions of books published in 2018. We invite authors to contact their publishers directly and suggest that their recent book be forwarded. (Keeping on top of the frequent changes of publishers' contact person can be a challenge, and too often the request is ignored anyway. Several winning books have had to be chased up from the publisher.)

Please also remember that in 2016 we added an award for a book deserving of special recognition. We recognized that almost invariably the Keith Matthews Award for the Best Book has been awarded for a scholarly work with the full academic apparatus. Increasingly we became concerned that we did not have a means for honouring important areas of maritime publishing that did not fit the academic mould. Therefore we have introduced the Keith Matthews Award for a Book Deserving of Special Recognition.

A book winning the Award for Special Recognition might be a work of a very regional or local focus, or perhaps a memoir without the scholarly apparatus that is expected of the best book award. However, it must be a book which, in the view of the committee, offers an important record that would, in the future, be cited by historians because it has captured an important aspect or quality of maritime life.

To be eligible for consideration the book must have been published in 2018 and either it was written by a Canadian on any maritime subject; or it was written by any national on a Canadian maritime subject.

The Awards Committee will determine for which award each book submitted should be considered.

The winners of the prizes for the best book and the book deserving special recognition will be announced at the Society's annual conference in **Thunder Bay, 22 - 24 August**. The awards committee will probably be making its decision in July. Please ensure that books are forwarded directly to committee members in sufficient time that they will be able to review them properly. If possible, this should be before the **end of June**.

The awards committee is comprised of individuals with a range of scholarship and interests.

- Roger Sarty - teaches naval, military and Canadian history at Wilfrid Laurier University. He was the senior historian at the Canadian Department of National Defence and then deputy director at the Canadian War Museum. He has won the book award, and has also received an honourable mention.
- Ian Yeates - a senior executive with SaskPower, brings to the committee the perspective of the well informed general reader.
- Bill Glover - a retired naval officer and independent historian. His areas of research and writing include the Royal Canadian Navy, the history of navigation, hydrography and exploration, and aspects of nineteenth century British merchant shipping.

Submissions should be sent directly to each member at:

Dr. William Glover  
271 Woodlawn Street  
Winnipeg, MB  
R3J 2H8

Dr. Roger Sarty  
History Department  
Wilfrid Laurier University  
75 University Avenue  
Waterloo, ON  
N2L 3C5

Mr. Ian Yeates  
SaskPower  
2025 Victoria Ave.  
Regina, Sask.  
S4P 0S1

# CNRS 2019 Conference Update

“Lower Lakes, Upper Lakes: Connecting Maritime Heritage, Part 2”  
Thunder Bay, Ontario, 22 to 24 August 2019

---

## Venue Selected

The 2019 conference and annual meeting will be held at the Prince Arthur Waterfront Hotel and Suites, 17 Cumberland Street North, which was built in 1910-1911 for the Canadian Northern Railway. Current owners recently announced plans to modernize the hotel, and work began in September 2018. The hotel offers a free airport shuttle and parking and is pet-friendly. Its amenities include a restaurant, heated pool and fitness room, and easy access to the Waterfront Park, the marina, and fine restaurants. The hotel has reserved a block of rooms at a rate of \$99 per night. The booking number is 256303 for members wishing to reserve a room. Please keep in mind that rooms are subject to a municipal accommodation tax of 4%.

## Local Arrangements

Professor Michel Beaulieu, chair of Lakehead University’s History Department and vice-president of the Thunder Bay Historical Museum Society, has kindly taken the lead in local arrangements. He will also be speaking at the conference on the Thunder Bay waterfront in film.

Receptions are planned to close the conference’s first two days with food, drink, and the telling of tall tales. Thursday’s reception will be on board the CCGS *Alexander Henry*, an icebreaker and buoy tender launched at the Port Arthur Shipbuilding Company in 1958. After an extended run as a museum ship at the Marine Museum of the Great Lakes at Kingston, the *Alexander Henry* returned to Thunder Bay in 2017 and is now operated by the Lakehead Transportation Museum Society. Friday’s reception will be held at HMCS *Griffon*, the shore establishment of Thunder Bay’s Naval Reserve Division. Both sites are within easy walking distance of the Prince Arthur Hotel.

## Program Developments

The call for papers has attracted several proposals that reflect the broad scope of maritime history, with several focusing on the upper Great Lakes. Program planning continues to evolve as we explore options for tours and site visits. The program, registration form, and other conference details will be available on the conference website in April. For more information, please visit: [https://www.cnrs-scrn.org/admin/conferences\\_e.html](https://www.cnrs-scrn.org/admin/conferences_e.html)

We look forward to seeing you in Thunder Bay in August!

Chris Madsen  
Michael Moir

## Book Review: *Lady Franklin of Russell Square*

by Erika Behrisch Elce. Alberta, Canada: Stonehouse Publications, 2018  
Reviewed by Philip Goldring

---

This is a book about loss. Indeed, in 2018 any new Canadian book with “Franklin” in its title, can generally be expected to deal with loss – loss of prestige, loss of men, and loss of ships under the command of a celebrated officer who led his third Arctic exploring expedition to oblivion, and to cannibalism.

The loss chronicled in Erika Elce’s novel may have started in the ice, but it ended in the heart of London, and in the heart of a woman whose own celebrity grew out of her husband’s fame. Elce has taken on the voice of Lady Franklin in order to lead the 21st-century reader through an emotional sea of hope, strain, and desperation. This is not just another conventional reprise of the history of Franklin’s third expedition, terrain that many of Canada’s popular historians have mastered. This is the tale of a woman’s hope and love slowly being ground into dust by her husband’s taste for adventure, glory and scientific achievement, and his remarkably bad luck.

Captain Sir John Franklin led two overland expeditions to map the Arctic coast of North America in the 1820s, was sidelined as older or more seasoned Arctic hands tried to find “the” Northwest Passage by sea, then mounted an exceptionally large, well-manned and well-provisioned expedition of his own in 1845. His brief marriage to poet Eleanor Porden had produced one daughter (also Eleanor), with a later (1828) marriage to Jane Griffin launching the career of the high-spirited heroine of this epistolary novel.

Erika Elce, a Canadian scholar of Victorian literature, is already familiar to close observers of the Franklin sagas. This book follows, by a decade, another slim volume of letters between Lady Franklin and those close to the expedition’s fate. The difference is that the 2009 volume consists of articles and letters in which Lady Franklin cajoled, or sparred with naval luminaries, a politician (Benjamin Disraeli) and writers in newspapers. Though those writings are the “true” historical voice, the language Lady Franklin used masked the underlying feelings of the woman – indeed, all of the women – who lost far more in the Arctic than the men who sat at tables at the Admiralty. Those feelings are expressed sensitively in these fictional letters.

Poignantly, *Lady Franklin of Russell Square* begins not at the dockside when Franklin sailed in 1845, but at Jane’s writing desk in London in May, 1847. The date is significant, because Sir John had died 5000 kilometres away on 11 June. The reader of these imaginary letters must therefore navigate a series of emotional upheavals concerning events which were dreaded long after they had actually passed. In 1848 Jane imagined a series of mishaps her husband and his crews would have to overcome before finding safety at some port on the Pacific. She offered him time to recover from all hardships, groaned that “Your silence turns a lot of me hollow, red and raw”, then signed off with a jocular, “Your first lieutenant on land, Jane.” By this time, she was taking matters into her own hands, hiring men and ships on her own account (using money coveted by her step-daughter) and sending them out to supplement or second-guess the official Admiralty searches. In April, 1849, she noted that “Beaufort... has asked me to give you up. Parry says the same. Please tell me what I should do. Your food has officially run out.”

This uneasy balance, with hope beside despair, continues through the novel’s 216 pages. The writing is engaging and convincing. Some of the finest passages occur early in the narrative, when Jane imagined herself still a wife and lover, yet was forced in her travels to share a bed with her niece: “what a different sleeping companion she is from you, you fuzzy dragon”. Gradually she lost this buoyant enthusiasm. Five and a half years after her husband’s death, with all the long faces in the Admiralty advising her to abandon the search, she admitted, “I am losing the stomach for this

fight, my love. Your Jane, but hardly herself, anymore”. The gradual crumpling of confidence emerged in 1854 – “I have to stop myself from taking your absence personally – did you leave me? Have I been abandoned?” And a year later: “the Navy isn’t your mistress; I am. I came second; the Navy came first.” Yet in the midst of all this she bristled at an acquaintance, “I have a husband, sir.” He replied with compassionate insincerity, “Of course you do, Lady Franklin. And a very lucky man he is.”

The book’s one notable deficiency is the lack of a map. Not a map of the hypothetical or real channels through the Arctic Archipelago; plenty of those can be found elsewhere. This reader would appreciate a map of the smallness of the world in which most of Lady Franklin’s feelings were worked out, the intimate landscapes of London between the Admiralty in Whitehall and Russell Square. Within this small span were both her father’s home in Bedford Place and the lodgings she took in Spring Gardens near the Admiralty. The emotional centre of Elce’s story, however, became Russell Square itself, where Jane’s imagination flourished, including brief chats with the 5<sup>th</sup> Duke of Bedford (a statue erected in 1807) and very hesitant exchanges with a gardener. Here she turned for consolation at moments of her greatest grief and, through her love of flowers, hinted at the life she gave up in pursuit of her husband’s, and then her own, dreams and ambitions. Although her experience was not that of other sailors’ wives, this is a delightful but very poignant glimpse of those who were left behind – sometimes forever.

#### **Biographical note for the author of *Lady Franklin of Russell Square*:**

Erika Behrisch Elce is an Associate Professor in the English, Culture, and Communication Department at the Royal Military College of Canada in Kingston. Her scholarly research focuses on nineteenth-century naval exploration and the practical as well as cultural tensions between the men who wrote the orders and those who carried them out. Her work has been funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Royal Military College’s Academic Research Programme. She is currently completing a scholarly monograph on the nineteenth-century Admiralty, science, and networks of influence. She will perform a reading at the Thunder Bay Conference reception from *Lady Franklin of Russell Square*.

#### **Biographical note of the Reviewer:**

Philip Goldring is an historian, formerly with Parks Canada and now a consultant specializing in northern and western Canadian history and toponymy. He is a Fellow of the Royal Canadian Geographical Society and a graduate of the University of London, adjoining Russell Square.

**Draft Minutes of the Council meeting held at 33 Greenaway Circle, Port Hope, Ontario**  
**Saturday, 9 March 2019**

**Present:**

Richard Gimblett, President; Walter Lewis, First Vice-President; Faye Kert, Second Vice-President; Errolyn Humphreys, Treasurer (by telephone); Michael Moir, Secretary; Sam McLean, Membership Secretary; Tom Malcomson, Jeff Noakes (by Internet), Margaret Schotte, and Ian Yeates, Councillors; and Roger Sarty, Chair of the Editorial Board.

Regrets: Richard Goette, David More, and Winston “Kip” Scoville, Councillors; and William “Bill” Glover, Chair of the Awards Committee.

**Calling to Order**

Richard called the meeting to order at 1000hrs.

**Minutes of Council’s Previous Meeting**

Walter moved, Faye seconded acceptance of the minutes of 21 June 2018. Carried.

**Treasurer’s Report**

Errolyn joined the meeting by telephone to discuss the financial statements for 2018 (see Attachment A). She noted the continuing improvement of the Society’s financial position, but also pointed out that expenses were lower than usual because only two issues of *The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord (TNM)* were published in 2018. The strength of the operating account will change if four to six issues are printed in 2019.

Last year’s dip in the market led to a slight reduction in the value of the Society’s investments. It should be kept in mind, however, that these investments have not been redeemed, and so the difference of \$301.96 in the balance sheet should be considered as an unrealized loss that will be corrected in the future when the markets recover.

Richard pointed out that revenue from membership renewals suggest support for the Society’s transition to open access for *TNM*. Some members have inquired about the availability of tax receipts for membership dues since they will not be receiving printed issues of *TNM*. Despite this change, electronic publication and other activities of the Society have costs associated with renewing domain names, translation of abstracts, mailing books for review, and other administrative overhead. Without this support, nothing would be available online. It was agreed that the Society would stay with the \$30 (digital journal)/\$70 (printed journal) thresholds as the cost of making *TNM* available to its members, and that receipts would be issued for payments in excess of these amounts. It was also agreed that Errolyn would work with Sam to explore electronic distribution of receipts.

The financial statements were received by Council, and Errolyn took leave of the meeting.

**Membership Report**

Sam reported that the Society is holding steady on membership levels, although he is concerned about delays in institutional renewals that may be a result of delays in publishing *TNM*. On the other hand, there is one new international member that donated \$250. Sam stressed the need to recruit new members – especially students – to ensure that the Society is sustainable.

Discussion touched on the benefit of tracking the years when people joined the Society to support member recognition, and amendments to the membership page on the website to clarify correlation in payment level and choice of journal format. Sam will work with Errolyn and Paul Adamthwaite to ensure that the downloaded PDF form is consistent with the web-based form.

Sam presented the results of his call for member feedback that was circulated by email on 24 February 2019, as well as his conversations with non-members (see Attachment B). The responses were grouped into three categories. The first was financial concerns. The Society needs a membership level with a lower fee for early career researchers (those people dealing with unemployment or work of a precarious nature, such as adjunct or part-time appointments). This approach should also extend to conference registration. Sam also suggested making available travel grants to promote the involvement of these people in the Society's conferences. Sam and Margaret will develop an appropriate membership level and fee rate to be submitted to Council for a vote by email through Michael, and to the membership for approval at the annual meeting.

The second category was mentoring opportunities, which was raised more often than the costs of membership and conference registration. This issue offers the benefit of attracting students. Council explored opportunities offered by membership renewal whereby people could volunteer to act as mentors in their areas of specialization. Sam also raised the possibility of involving early career researchers in producing *TNM*. There was considerable support for this initiative, but it was recognized in these situations there must be payment for work performed.

The third category was the tangible benefits of membership. *TNM* is a good start. It was suggested that the titles of books sent out for review in *TNM* be listed on the Society's website with images of their covers; Faye will follow up with Paul Adamthwaite (the Society's webmaster), and with Sam to ensure that coverage is extended to social media. Other benefits could include a discount on new books written by members and social events such as seminars, tours of museums and archives, and pub nights that build upon Chris Madsen's past proposal for regional branch activities. It was suggested that the Society could work with local museums to deliver maritime-focused presentations to tap into a larger community.

Throughout his presentation, Sam stressed the need for better and more frequent communication with members and potential members, especially using social media. The Society needs to express its strong desire to connect more effectively with students and those who work in French. Roger, Walter, Sam will work with Paul Adamthwaite to provide content that is targeted toward students (such as mentoring) and designed for mobile devices. Richard will work with Sam to report on the viability of paid social media internship to gather content.

### **Succession Planning**

Richard emphasized that we need to start thinking about who will move up to the president and vice-presidents positions to ensure an orderly succession within Council.

### **Publications**

Bill Glover has tendered his resignation to take effect upon the publication of the last two numbers of *TNM* for 2018. Discussion focused on finding a new editor to follow Bill, and how to complete the issues for 2018 in a timely manner.

Roger observed that *Argonauta* continues to meet the terms of the Society's mission, and Council was unanimous in expressing its appreciation for the excellent work of Isabel Campbell, Colleen McKee, and Kip Scoville in producing such a high-quality publication on a regular basis.

Roger also noted that content from NASOH members has dried up, and papers are not arriving from the United States despite efforts to recruit them for the journal. Options to expedite production of numbers 3 and 4 – as well as issues for 2019 – include research notes featuring transcripts of archival documents, research notes from graduate students, guest editors, theme issues on topics such as environmental history, and development of an editorial committee. A team approach could be effective, but it requires an editor-in-chief with a reputation that will attract contributors and maintain confidence in the journal's editorial process. Richard's next "President's Corner" in *Argonauta* will provide an explanation for the delays in publishing *TNM*, outline Council's approach to dealing with these challenges, and express our confidence in the future of the journal.

Michael gave update on developments with York Digital Journals and use of the Open Journal Systems (OJS) software. York University Libraries recently implemented the latest version of OJS, and this is an opportune time to add *TNM* to the digital platform. While the initial focus will be uploading the journal's back issues, we can also implement the software's automated workflow to produce new issues for 2019 as the journal's editorial approach evolves in the coming year.

### **Upcoming Conferences**

Michael provided an update on local arrangements for the 2019 conference in Thunder Bay. The Prince Arthur Hotel will be the conference venue, and a block of rooms have been reserved at a reduced rate. Receptions are planned for the icebreaker *Alexander Henry* and the shore establishment of the Naval Reserve Division, HMCS *Griffon*. Professor Michel Beaulieu, chair of Lakehead University's History Department, has taken the lead on local arrangements, and has secured several donations to offset some conference expenses. Eleven proposals for presentations have been received, with the deadline extended to 1 April 2019. A list of presenters and abstracts will appear in the next issue of *Argonauta*, accompanied by an overview of conference activities.

Sam suggested a social media strategy to raise the profile of the Society on Twitter. Live tweeting during a conference is challenging, so Sam proposed an approach that includes taking an image at the beginning of each presentation to be tweeted with the name of the speaker, title, and abstract of the paper. Much of the work for these tweets could be completed before the conference begins. Sam will work with Michael to implement this strategy.

Council concurred with the suggested registration fee of \$100 for members, and \$125 for non-members. The student rate of \$50 will be extended to include early career researchers as described in the Membership Report.

Upcoming conferences include North Vancouver in 2020, and Victoria in 2021.

### **Awards**

Council confirmed that the Gerry Panting Award for New Scholars will be funded by the Society for 2019, and that this expense is not expected to be recovered through conference registration fees.

Bill has put out call to publishers to submit works to be considered for the Keith Matthews Award for Best Book. If all four numbers of *TNM* for 2018 are not published by the time of the conference, selection of the Matthews Award for Best Scholarly Article will be deferred.

Council reviewed the criteria for the Jacques Cartier MA Prize and identified several areas that require revision. Margaret will draft new criteria. Deadline for submissions will be 31 May 2019. Submissions will be reviewed by Margaret, Tom, and possibly Sam if there are many entries.

Roger moved, Margaret seconded that the new terms of reference for the Jacques Cartier Prize be submitted to Council by 31 March 2019 for a vote by email through Michael, and that a

cash award of \$250 be given to the winner. Carried.

**Adjournment**

There being no further business to conduct, Richard asked for a motion to adjourn the Council meeting at 1603hrs. Ian so moved, Tom seconded.

Respectfully submitted  
Michael Moir  
Secretary

Attachment A: Comparative Balance Sheet and Income Statement, 2017-2018

Attachment B: Membership Report Part II: Responses on Member Benefits and Attractions

# CNRS Comparative Balance Sheet

	<u>As at 31-Dec-18</u>	<u>As at 31-Dec-17</u>	<u>Difference</u>
<b>Current Assets</b>			
BMO Operating Account	28,000.52	19,006.27	8,994.25
Investments	7,065.36	7,367.32	-301.26
Accounts Receivable	1,198.80	2,205.00	-1,006.20
<b>Total Current Assets</b>	<u><b>36,264.68</b></u>	<u><b>28,578.59</b></u>	<b>7,686.09</b>
<b>TOTAL ASSETS</b>	<u><b>\$ 36,264.68</b></u>	<u><b>\$ 28,578.59</b></u>	<b>7,686.09</b>
<b>Liabilities</b>			
Accounts Payable	1,313.35	2,697.30	-1,383.95
Membership Fees Received in Advance	1,270.00	140.00	1,130.00
<b>Total Liabilities</b>	<u><b>2,583.35</b></u>	<u><b>2,837.30</b></u>	<b>-253.95</b>
<b>TOTAL LIABILITY</b>	<u><b>\$ 2,583.35</b></u>	<u><b>\$ 2,837.30</b></u>	<b>-235.95</b>
<b>EQUITY</b>			
<b>Members Equity</b>			
Current Earnings	7,126.55	2,571.87	4,554.68
Retained Earnings	22,743.58	20,171.71	2,571.87
Unrealized Gain/Loss (OE)	(2,589.26)	(2,287.30)	-301.96
Gain or Loss on Exchange	6,400.46	5,285.01	1,115.45
<b>Total Member's Equity</b>	<u><b>33,681.33</b></u>	<u><b>25,741.29</b></u>	<b>7940.04</b>
<b>TOTAL EQUITY</b>	<u><b>\$ 33,681.33</b></u>	<u><b>\$ 25,741.29</b></u>	<b>7,940.04</b>
<b>LIABILITIES AND EQUITY</b>	<u><b>\$ 36,264.68</b></u>	<u><b>\$ 28,578.59</b></u>	<b>\$ 7,686.09</b>

(1) Accounts receivable amount of \$1,198.80 represents billing to NASOH for December issue

(2) Accounts Payable includes the following amounts:  
 \$931.40 - Faye Kert to Mailing and Distribution expenses for the year  
 \$381.95 - Canada Post

(3) Unrealized Gain/Loss represents the change in the investment account ( see Assets)

(4) Gain or Loss on Exchange represents the exchange rates on USD cheque conversion to Canadian  
 (it is a cumulative amount over the years - this year's amount - \$1,115.45 deposited to bank account)

# CNRS

## Comparative Income Statement

	<u>As at</u> <u>31-Dec-18</u>	<u>As at</u> <u>31-Dec-17</u>	<u>Difference</u>
<b>REVENUE</b>			
<b>Membership</b>			
Individual - Domestic	5,065.00	4,140.00	925.00
Individual - Foreign	1,165.00	960.00	205.00
Student - Domestic	870.00	145.00	725.00
Student - Foreign	35.00	30.00	5.00
Institutional - Domestic	1,710.00	1,610.00	100.00
Institutional - Foreign	1,940.00	1,680.00	260.00
Supporting	2,010.00	2,200.00	(190.00)
<b>Total Membership Revenue</b>	<b><u>\$ 12,795.00</u></b>	<b><u>\$ 10,765.00</u></b>	<b>2,030.00</b>
<b>Total Publications Revenue</b>	<b><u>\$ 929.66</u></b>	<b><u>\$ 415.54</u></b>	<b>514.12</b>
<b>Total Conference Revenue</b>	<b><u>\$ 2,060.00</u></b>	<b><u>\$ 2,255.00</u></b>	<b>(195.00)</b>
<b>Total Investment Revenue</b>	<b><u>\$ 114.02</u></b>	<b><u>\$ 95.41</u></b>	<b>18.61</b>
<b>TOTAL REVENUE</b>	<b><u>\$ 15,898.68</u></b>	<b><u>\$ 13,530.95</u></b>	<b>2,367.73</b>
<b>Administrative Costs</b>			
Bank & Credit Card Charges	691.44	770.98	(79.54)
Prepaid Mailing and Distr. Expense	0.00	0.00	0.00
<b>Total Administrative Costs</b>	<b><u>\$ 691.44</u></b>	<b><u>\$ 770.98</u></b>	<b>(79.54)</b>
<b>Publications Costs</b>			
Mailing & Distribution	2,710.81	2,555.49	155.32
Printing - General	508.22	353.00	(353.00)
Printing Expense - NM	4,517.46	9,406.97	(4,889.51)
NASOH - Reduction	-2,338.65	-4635.00	2,296.35
Total Printing Expenses	2,178.81	4,771.97	(2,593.16)
Editing Expense	508.22	514.05	(5.83)
<b>Total Publication Costs</b>	<b><u>\$ 5,397.84</u></b>	<b><u>\$ 8,194.51</u></b>	<b>(2,796.67)</b>
<b>Total Conference Expenses</b>	<b><u>\$ 693.06</u></b>	<b><u>\$ 577.61</u></b>	<b>115.45</b>
<b>Total Prize Expenses</b>	<b><u>\$ 1,050.00</u></b>	<b><u>\$ 0.00</u></b>	<b>1,050.00</b>
<b>Other Expenses</b>			
Digital	206.82	425.36	91.46
<b>Total Other Expenses</b>	<b><u>\$ 516.83</u></b>	<b><u>\$ 425.36</u></b>	<b>91.46</b>
<b>Total Membership Expenses</b>	<b><u>\$ 20.00</u></b>	<b><u>\$ 0.00</u></b>	<b>20.00</b>
<b>Total Sales Tax Expense</b>	<b><u>\$ 402.97</u></b>	<b><u>\$ 993.62</u></b>	<b>(590.65)</b>
<b>TOTAL EXPENSE</b>	<b><u>\$ 8,772.13</u></b>	<b><u>\$ 10,962.08</u></b>	<b>-2,189.95</b>
<b>NET INCOME</b>	<b><u>\$ 7,126.55</u></b>	<b><u>\$ 2,568.87</u></b>	<b>\$ 4,557.68</b>

# Membership Report Part II: Responses on Member Benefits and Attractions

By Sam McLean

I asked both current members of the CNRS and also other colleagues about what they look for in an academic society in terms of costs and benefits. For non-members, I primarily spoke to current PhD students, to recent graduates, to independent scholars, and to adjunct faculty. Their responses can be summarized into the following three main categories:

## 1) Financial Concerns

- For annual memberships - costs must be kept down. “50 is reasonable, 100 starts to really hurt.”
- When it comes to the Conference - travel costs must be considered as well
- Many people mentioned that they drop out of societies after graduating because they no longer qualify for ‘student’ rates and cannot afford full membership rates
- Making travel grants available for student members/adjuncts, such as for assisting on research trips

## 2) Mentoring Opportunities

- This was mentioned even more often than costs
- People are especially interested when societies openly make mentoring a priority
- One option mentioned was to involve students/ECRs in the editing of the journal- for example, create a “position” which would be the second reviewer for every submitted article
- Another option is to create a database of members who are willing to mentor younger scholars, and advertise those possibilities to attract students

## 3) Other Benefits - Tangible and Social

- A printed journal is a good thing - it does feel like a tangible benefit - “get our money’s worth.”
- Another major one was for the Society to have subscriptions to certain databases (an example given was Early English Books Online), which members may not have access to through other sources
- The possibility of discounts on new books by members (which might be able to be negotiated with The Nautical Mind or another bookstore)
- Social events, for example CNRS- hosted seminars, talks, pub nights
- Tours of museums and archives for CNRS members, not directly associated with the Conference. The other major response - both from the AGM in 2018 and from recent responses is that the CNRS must be much better at communicating with the members. This does mean more active - but it also means things like communicating production issues with *The Northern Mariner*

Action Points:

- Council should consider extending the 'Student' rate to recent graduates and adjunct students, for reasons of keeping a membership affordable for unemployed or underemployed members who would like a print journal
  - Council should very strongly consider creating multiple avenues for mentorship within the Society
  - Council should consider other membership benefits, and in particular determine what can be achieved in the short, medium, and long-term
  - Council should consider further developing both internal and external communications strategies
-

# Guidelines for Authors

*Argonauta* follows *The Chicago Manual of Style* available at this link:  
<http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/home.html>.

However, we utilize Canadian spelling rules, in lieu of American rules, unless referring to proper American names. Thus, the Canadian Department of Defence and the American Department of Defense are both correct.

For ship names, only the first letter of the names of Royal Canadian Navy ships and submarines is capitalized, and the name appears in italics. For example:

Her Majesty's Canadian Ship (HMCS) *Queenston*  
Her Majesty's Canadian Ship (HMCS) *Châteauguay*

Class of ship/submarine: *Victoria*-class submarines (not VICTORIA Class submarines)

Former HMCS *Fraser* rather than *Ex-Fraser*

Foreign ships and submarines:

USS *Enterprise*  
HMS *Victory*  
HMAS *Canberra* 3

Because *Argonauta* aims to publish articles that may be easily understood by senior high school students and other non-experts, we encourage authors to include general introductory context, suggestions for additional reading, and links to relevant websites. We publish memoirs, humour, reviews of exhibits, descriptions of new archival acquisitions, and outstanding student papers. We also publish debates and discussions about changes in maritime history and its future. We encourage submissions in French and assure our authors that all French submissions will be edited for style by a well-qualified Francophone.

Although *Argonauta* is not formally peer-reviewed, we have two editors who carefully review and edit each and every article. For those producing specialized, original academic work, we direct your attention to *The Northern Mariner* which is peer-reviewed and appropriate for longer, in-depth analytical works.

All submissions should be in Word format, utilizing Arial 12 pt. All endnotes should be numbered from 1 consecutively to the highest or last number, without any repeating of numbers, in the usual North American Academic manner described in the *Chicago Manual* which also provides guidance on using the Word insert function at this link: <https://www.ivcc.edu/stylebooks/stylebook5.aspx?id=14646>. For technical reasons, we prefer that authors use endnotes rather than footnotes. Typically an article in *Argonauta* will be 4 to 6 pages long, though we do accommodate longer, informal pieces. We strongly encourage the use of online links to relevant websites and the inclusion of bibliographies to assist the younger generation of emerging scholars. The *Chicago Manual* provides detailed instructions on the styles used.

All photos should be sent separately and accompanied by captions, describing the image, crediting the source, and letting us know where the original image is held. Authors are responsible to ensure that they have copyright permission for any images, art work, or other protected materials they utilize. We ask that every author submit a written statement to that effect. The images should be named to reflect the order in which they are to appear in the text ( Authurnameimage1, Authurnameimage2, Authurnameimage3) and the text should be marked to show where the images are to be added (add Authurnameimage 1 here, add Authurnameimage2 here, etc.)

All authors are also responsible to ensure that they are familiar with plagiarism and that they properly credit all sources they use. *Argonauta* recommends that authors consult Royal Military College's website on academic integrity and ethical standards at this link:  
<https://www.rmcc-cmrc.ca/en/registrars-office/academic-regulations#ai>

We encourage our authors to acknowledge all assistance provided to them, including thanking librarians, archivists, and colleagues if relevant sources, advice or help were provided. Editors are not responsible for monitoring these matters.

All authors are asked to supply a short biography unless the text already contains these biographical details or the author is already well known to our readers.



# The Canadian Nautical Research Society

P.O. Box 34029, Station B  
Ottawa, Ontario, CANADA K2J 4B1  
<http://www.cnrs-scrn.org>

CNRS membership supports the multi-disciplinary study of maritime, marine and naval subjects in and about Canada. Members receive:

- ☛ The Northern Mariner / Le Marin du nord, a quarterly refereed open access journal dedicated to publishing research and writing about all aspects of maritime history of the northern hemisphere. It publishes book reviews, articles and research notes on merchant shipping, navies, maritime labour, marine archaeology, maritime societies and the like.
- ☛ *Argonauta*, a quarterly on-line newsletter, which publishes articles, opinions, news and information about maritime history and fellow members.
- ☛ An Annual General Meeting and Conference located in maritime-minded locations, where possible with our U.S. colleagues in the North American Society for Oceanic History (NASOH).
- ☛ Affiliation with the International Commission of Maritime History (ICMH).

Membership is by calendar year and is an exceptional value. Individuals or groups interested in furthering the work of the CNRS may wish to take one of several other categories of membership. CNRS is a registered charity and all donations to the Society are automatically acknowledged with a tax receipt. Should you wish to renew on-line, go to: [www.cnrs-scrn.org](http://www.cnrs-scrn.org)

	<u>Canadian</u>	<u>International</u>	<u>Digital Only</u>	
Individual	\$70	\$80	\$30	Benefactor \$250
Institutional	\$95	\$105	n/a	Corporate \$500
Student	\$35	\$35	\$35	Patron \$1000 or above
NASOH	n/a	n/a	\$30	

Please print clearly and return with payment (all rates in Canadian \$).

**NB:** CNRS does not sell or exchange membership information with other organizations or commercial enterprises. The information provided on this form will only be used for sending you our publications or to correspond with you concerning your membership and the Society's business.

Name : \_\_\_\_\_ E-mail : \_\_\_\_\_

Address : \_\_\_\_\_

Payment by cheque \_\_\_\_\_ Money order \_\_\_\_\_ Visa \_\_\_\_\_ Master Card \_\_\_\_\_

Credit card number \_\_\_\_\_ Expiry date \_\_\_\_\_

Signature : \_\_\_\_\_ Date : \_\_\_\_\_