

# MULTINATIONAL NAVAL OPERATIONS: THE CANADIAN NAVY IN THE PERSIAN GULF 1990-91

by Lieutenant(N) Richard Gimblett


## Introduction

Navies as a general rule have not played a significant role in operations sanctioned by the United Nations. In Korea, the obvious exception, there was an immediate escalation to hostilities and overwhelming 'Western' Allied participation: not a likely direction for the future.<sup>1</sup> The Persian Gulf conflict, by contrast, saw a maritime presence progress through display of resolve and embargo enforcement to outright hostilities. It is clearly a better model for multinational naval forces implementing UN Resolutions. The Canadian Navy was deeply involved and the part it played is worthy of study as an example of the role to which the naval force of a middle power can aspire.

## The Canadian Task Group Deploys

Following the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq on 2 August 1990, the Canadian Ambassador to the UN, Yves Fortier, was quick to demonstrate Canada's concern that the world body manage the response to the crisis. With Canada then occupying a temporary seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC) he was in a unique position to do so. Prior to the scheduled 31 December 1990 relinquishing of the position, Canada voted in favour of each of the 12 resolutions on Kuwait, and indeed co-sponsored eight of them, including the key 660, 661, 665 and 678 resolutions.<sup>2</sup>

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HMCS *Protecteur* departs Halifax for the Persian Gulf.

DND Photo

For this political action to be credible, it had to be backed up by a complementary military response. Shortly after the invasion was reported, contingency planning was initiated in National Defence Headquarters with input from the various Commands, including Maritime Command Headquarters, to determine if the government had any option for military action. While this analysis was in progress, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney had two intimate discussions with President George Bush (a 4 August telephone exchange and then a private dinner on 6 August) in which the PM stressed the importance for Canada that

the coalition of forces be mandated by the United Nations, and that any Canadian contribution be part of a UN-sponsored action.

Indeed, this action was already taking form. The Security Council had condemned the invasion in Resolution 660 on 2 August, and, on the afternoon of 6 August, Resolution 661 imposed mandatory trade sanctions.<sup>3</sup> As required, Turkey closed its pipelines to the shipment of Iraqi oil on 7 August; with all land routes now blocked, the only avenue open for Iraq to ship oil was by way of its newly acquired access to the Persian Gulf through Kuwaiti waters (one of Saddam Hussein's invasion objectives, as the Shatt-al-Arab had been closed since early in the Iran-Iraq War). International sentiment, therefore, pointed to the commitment of naval forces to monitor the effectiveness of the sanctions.

At a press conference on 7 August, the PM allowed that "Canada would offer military help if the NATO Council... decided that it was necessary," but did not elaborate as to the possibilities.<sup>4</sup> Cabinet was formally briefed on the choice of options (air, sea and

land) on 9 August. External Affairs Minister Joe Clark immediately left for a special closed session of NATO foreign ministers in Brussels on 10 August to discuss collective action.

The Canadian decision was announced by the Prime Minister later on 10 August: a naval Task Group comprising HMC Ships *Athabaskan* (flagship) and *Terra Nova*, both destroyers, and the supply ship *Protecteur*, with their five embarked *Sea King* helicopters, would deploy to the region "to deter further Iraqi aggression," arriving sometime after mid-September.<sup>5</sup> The Operation Order for the appropriately named Operation *FRICITION* further directed the Task Group "To establish a military presence in the Persian Gulf area in support of Canadian policy." At this early stage the intent was for the ships to 'monitor' the implementation of sanctions from a vantage point in the Gulf of Oman. Their mission was left purposely vague to allow the government some room to manoeuvre should the situation change before the ships' arrival in-theatre.<sup>6</sup>

Although senior naval commanders had been privy to the decision, the announcement caught many on the waterfront by surprise. All week long the three ships had been continuing preparations for the annual fall deployment for the NATO Exercise *TEAMWORK*, and the Persian Gulf was an area in which the Canadian Navy had never previously deployed. Canada had few identifiable vital national interests in the area, and the threat to naval vessels was generally accepted as beyond the capabilities of any warships in Canadian commission. After all, the Iraqi Air Force included amongst its weaponry the *Exocet* anti-ship missile, which the Argentines had used with great effect against the Royal Navy in the Falklands War. Indeed the Iraqis had displayed no hesitation in using the weapon, primarily against tanker traffic in the Gulf, but also in the dramatic attack on the *USS Stark* on 17 May 1987. New-construction Canadian warships and those in refit for modernization would be equipped to coun-



*Terra Nova's* quarterdeck, showing her radical transformation: her ASW mortars and ASROC launcher have been removed to make room for CIWS (right) and *Harpoon*.

ter the *Exocet*, but these programmes had been delayed over the years and none of the ships were yet operational.

Canadian tactical preoccupations thus shifted dramatically from the cold waters of the Norwegian Sea to the heat of the Persian Gulf. The ramifications of that shift were more than merely geographical. Despite the perceived threat of further Iraqi aggression, the scenario at that time remained one of 'no peace, no war.' No Captain would want his ship to be the next *Stark* or *Vincennes*,<sup>7</sup> either of which incident could precipitate a conflict.

The Task Group was being thrust into a tense situation which would require stringent command and control arrangements and quick-reaction self-defence measures.

The mission of the ships and aircraft was literally turned upside down, from the traditional emphasis on anti-submarine warfare (ASW) to the previously secondary anti-surface and anti-air warfare (ASUW/AAW). Work began almost immediately at Halifax Dockyard and CFB Shearwater on extensive upgrades to the surface warfare and self-defence capabilities of the ships and helicopters: ASW mortars were removed from both of the destroyers and replaced by Close-in Weapon Systems (CIWS); *Harpoon* surface-to-surface missiles were fitted on *Terra Nova* in place of ASROC (an anti-submarine weapon); and the dipping sonars were taken out of the *Sea Kings* to provide space and weight for new equipment. Of all the refits, *Protecteur's* was especially dramatic as the previously unarmed tanker was brought up to a self-defence par with the destroyers, with new radars, electronic warfare equipment, SATCOM and two CIWS mounts. The bulk of the ships' equipment upgrades were available from material awaiting fitting in the ships of the Canadian Patrol



New systems fitted in *Athabaskan* included *Javelin* missiles (foreground) and the *Phalanx* CIWS for missile defence.

Frigate and Tribal class modernization programmes (e.g., CIWS, *Harpoon*, SATCOM). Some of the helicopter upgrades were taken from other Forces' aircraft, but many had to be purchased outright.

Just two weeks after the announcement of the deployment, on Friday 24 August, the Task Group (designated TG 302.3) sailed from Halifax, to the biggest farewell celebration ever seen in the port city. Their mission was given further definition the next day when the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 665, calling upon member states which had deployed naval forces to monitor the sanctions "to use measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary ... to halt all inward and outward shipping."<sup>8</sup> Already on 12 August the United States Navy had found it necessary to fire warning shots on an Iraqi tanker in the Red Sea.

The euphoria of the departure overshadowed the fact that the original plan had been for the Task Group to depart 21 August; the complexity of the refits had proven greater than anticipated. That such extensive 'ad hoc' refits were accomplished so quickly, and with surprisingly few installation problems, was a major achievement. Still, all three ships were aging, and as if to underline the precarious nature of the venture, both *Protecteur* and *Ter-*

ra Nova suffered potentially disabling engineering problems (eventually corrected) the day after sailing.

On their trans-Atlantic voyage, the Task Group conducted an intensive training programme, culminating in a compressed Workups in the approaches to Gibraltar. Here the Royal Navy, which had undertaken regular patrols to the Gulf over the years, assisted by providing a variation on their Gulf training package as well as opening their base facilities. For the Canadian force the learning curve was steep, but the progress of the Task Group was confirmed by the successful accomplishment of a Combat Readiness Check on 6-7 September in the Gibraltar Mediterranean Operating Areas (OPAREAs). Among those testing the responses of the ships were CF-18s from CFB Baden-Soelingen, getting a foretaste of Middle East action by flying simulated missile attack profiles against the ships.

Although the Task Group was now in all respects ready to commence the transit of the Mediterranean, a slight but productive detour was made. Instead of making directly for Suez, the Task Group turned northeast to take advantage of live training offered by the French in countering the deadly *Exocet* missile.

Canadian domestic politics demanded a further delay. A planned degaussing serial at the NATO facilities in Augusta, Sicily was extended into a 48 hour port visit (10-12 September) while the political authority for the operation was obtained. Under Canadian parliamentary tradition, the government cannot order forces to a theatre of war without an Order-in-Council approved by Cabinet; furthermore, that Order must be debated in the House of Commons within 10 days of its publication. At the time of the invasion, the House was in summer recess and not scheduled to sit again until 24 September. Confident in the action taken and not wanting to expedite a partisan discussion of government action on this issue (and also the other pressing domestic issues of the Oka Mohawk Crisis and the worsening economic situation), the ruling Conservatives saw no requirement for an early recall of Parliament.

Therefore, the Order-in-Council placing the Task Group on 'Active Service' was not signed until 15 September 1990,<sup>9</sup> while the Task Group was at anchor off Port Said. The ships made the southbound transit of the Suez Canal that night. Canadian naval forces had last entered an active theatre some forty years earlier, on the last UN-sponsored naval operation, in Korea.

### Multinational Forces (MNF) Embargo Operations


While the Task Group was in transit from Sicily to Suez, the scope of the Canadian participation had undergone a major revision. On the 14th, the Prime Minister announced at a press conference that "based on military considerations" the destination of the ships was no longer the relatively benign Gulf of Oman, but the front lines of naval operations in the Central Persian Gulf proper, and he was now ordering a squadron of CF-18 *Hornet* fighter aircraft to the Gulf as well to "provide air cover for our own ships and the ships of friendly nations."<sup>10</sup> Both these developments can be traced to the Bahrain Naval Conference of 9-10 September.

The Commander of the Task Group, Commodore K.J. Summers, flew from Gibraltar to attend the Conference, which had been called by the United States to discuss mutual cooperation and support amongst the fourteen Western nations and eight Gulf and neighbouring states then planning to contribute to the interception operations. The participants generally agreed that, without an overall UN command structure, ships would operate under their own national control and rules of engagement. This was a recipe for disaster, but it virtually went without saying

among the naval professionals there that some overall coordination was required, and would be the responsibility of the largest force present, the United States Navy.

Other than the USN, none of the Coalition forces (Canada included), had demonstrated any interest in operating closer to Iraq-Kuwait than the southern Persian Gulf, in deference to the deadly potential of the *Mirage-Exocet*. The bulk of the Gulf merchant trade passing to the north of Qatar was therefore left to the very finite resources of the American Middle East Force Commander to intercept.<sup>11</sup> The USN was anxiously seeking assistance in this vital area, known as the 'CAG' (Central Arabian [Persian] Gulf), and was particularly keen that the Canadian Navy, of all the Coalition forces, join them for reasons of compatibility of equipment and procedures.

Commodore Summers immediately gave serious consideration to this invitation. A quick but thorough staff analysis confirmed his appreciation that the Central Persian Gulf was a safe operating area for the Canadian Task Group, given a candid assessment of Iraqi war-fighting ability, the upgraded ships' systems and the high standard of training achieved. The formal



proposal dispatched to Canada noted that not only was a Central Persian Gulf operating area commensurate with the stated mission of the Task Group, but "If Canada is to play a high profile, meaningful and professionally challenging role in the Gulf, then we should operate in patrol area Charlie (see Map 1)."

The Commodore's superiors in Maritime Command and NDHQ agreed, and easily gained the approval of Cabinet for not only the change in Operational Area, but also for a further Canadian presence in another element — the air. The option of sending an air component had been one of those presented to Cabinet on 9 August, but was discarded for several reasons, including the necessity to recall Parliament to order its deployment (the naval Task Group had the advantage, proven out, of taking longer to arrive in the 'war theatre'). The prospect of Canadian ships actually operating in the Gulf provided the perfect opportunity for re-opening the air option, and that was how the move was announced to the public on 14 September: the CF-18s, taken from the Canadian NATO forces in West Germany, would be employed flying Combat Air Patrol (CAP) protection for the Canadian and other Coalition naval forces in the Persian Gulf.

Contingency planning for the air deployment had been kept in progress all along as Operation SCIMITAR, and the readiness of Canadian Forces Europe to proceed was well advanced. Diplo-

matic approval for the stationing of the Canadian Air Task Group, Middle East (CATGME) was obtained from Qatar on 1 October; the first eight aircraft arrived at Doha on the 7th; and the first CAP mission was flown on the 9th.

After a quick stopover in Djibouti for replenishment and staff consultations with French forces operating from there,<sup>12</sup> the Canadian Task Group passed through the Strait of Hormuz during the night of 25-26 September and arrived at Bahrain on the 27th. Further staff meetings with USN officials headquartered there confirmed the earlier arrangements and familiarized the ships' officers with recent developments.

Another change awaited the Canadians in Bahrain. With the expanding sea and air commitment to the area, NDHQ had decided that a national theatre command was required to represent Canada in multinational forums and to coordinate the non-operational support effort. Commodore Summers was immediately summoned to Ottawa to discuss the terms of what would be his new appointment as Canadian Forces Commander, Middle East (CANFORCOMME). The Joint Headquarters (JHQ) eventually opened on 6 November, in Bahrain, to facilitate links with the naval forces operating from there and the air squadron in nearby Qatar. Coordination with the Americans was maintained through liaison officers in Riyadh and, later, aboard the American flagship *USS Midway*.

In the meanwhile operations were joined. On 1 October, *Athabaskan* and *Terra Nova*, now with Captain(N) Duncan Miller taking over as the Task Group Commander, sailed to commence their patrols in the agreed upon Charlie sectors. That day, the ships made a combined total of 16 hailing interceptions. The assumption was that the first patrol would be low-key as the ships' companies became acquainted with their new environment. However, shortly after sunset Captain Miller was informed by the local American commander, embarked in *USS O'Brien*, that a planned boarding by another warship of the Indian relief ship *MV Tipu Sultan* had been aborted due to deteriorating weather and sea conditions. On her continued passage to Iraq the vessel would pass close to *Athabaskan's* position, and *O'Brien* requested the Canadians attempt a boarding so that the Coalition blockade could be seen to be working. Under the watchful gaze of *USS O'Brien* and *HMS Jupiter*, standing by to provide support,<sup>13</sup> *Athabaskan's* boarding party made their way by boat to the vessel, to find the Master cooperative and the cargo as declared. But the fact that this first Canadian boarding was accomplished within the first 12 hours on patrol and in trying circumstances — "in the dark, with a strong 20-knot wind blowing amid rough seas"<sup>14</sup> — gave the Canadian sailors a new appreciation of the value of the training to date, and earned the quick respect of their Coalition partners.

That first day set the tone for the Canadian participation in the Multinational Interception Forces Operations, or MIF Ops. Of the 6963 interceptions conducted by the MNF prior to the outbreak of war on 17 January 1991, the Canadians accounted for 1764 (25.3 percent); during the war, when operational attention was occupied elsewhere, a further 113 hailings were recorded, making a Canadian Operation *FRICION* total of 1877, or 24.5 percent of the 7645 MNF hailings conducted to 3 March 1991, when the Task Group participation effectively ended. Of the 960 boardings undertaken to 3 March, Canada completed 22, or 2 percent.<sup>15</sup>

The apparent discrepancy between the interception and boarding totals actually underscores the import of the Canadian MNF participation in the Central Gulf. By the end of September the closure of the Iraqi and Kuwaiti ports had significantly


diminished the volume of seaborne trade in the Persian Gulf proper, and the interception and boarding activity shifted to the Red Sea, stopping blockade runners destined for the Jordanian port of Aqaba. With fewer ships in the Persian Gulf, it follows there were fewer to intercept, and of those even fewer meeting boarding criteria. This puts the Canadian total in sharper focus, pointing to the conclusion that the Canadian Task Group must have conducted an inordinate number of the interceptions made in the Persian Gulf in the tense October-December 1990 period.

The aggressive manner in which the Task Group carried out their mandate accounts in large part for the disproportionate totals. (The fact that the USN and RN ships stationed in the Central Arabian Gulf were preoccupied with AAW picket duties must not be overlooked.) *Terra Nova* established a Coalition record of sorts when in a six hour period on 13 December she boarded and inspected a flotilla of eight vessels returning from dredging operations in Iraq. Even in the normal course of patrolling, the Canadian ships would often average 20 interceptions per day. The overall total was further enhanced by the fact that the Canadian concept of operations was to maintain two of their three ships on patrol at any time (the third put in to port on a rotation basis for replenishment, maintenance and rest, in what came to be known as 'RAMPs' - Rear Area Maintenance Periods). This frenzied pace of operations was maintained throughout October, November, December, and into January. Wartime operations (see below) would create different circumstances.

That such a varied assortment of navies could conduct operations without any formal structure was exceptional, and there were certainly some pitfalls. Although monthly low-level coordination meetings ensured there was no duplication of effort in sector allocation, a number of problems remained in the integration of the allied and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) navies. The mid-November amphibious assault exercise *IMMINENT THUNDER*, and then the passing on 29 November of UNSC 678, authorizing the Coalition "to use all necessary means ... to restore international peace and security in the area,"<sup>16</sup> both served to raise tensions to such a level that significant danger of inadvertent 'friendly-fire' encounters existed. On 12 December, Commodore Summers, in his capacity as CANFORCOMME, hosted the second Multinational Force Naval Commanders conference, which saw some progress in cooperation between Allied and Gulf navies. The deliberations were given focus by the opening remarks of COMIDEASTFOR, who noted "how operations in the Gulf will become more complicated as the USN carriers will be making more frequent incursions."

Special mention must be made of the part played by the supply ship *Protecteur* during this pre-war interception operations phase. She added to the Task Group's flexibility by taking on her share of embargo enforcement, an activity not normally conducted by support vessels. The difference can be accounted for in part in that *Protecteur's* ship's company had been trained along with those of the destroyers to conduct interdiction, and the ship was outfitted with the weapons and self-protection to carry out the task.

*Protecteur's* deployment was unique in another important respect. Until late-December, she was the only tanker operating in the Central Persian Gulf. Close to the frontline of the embargo, she was crucial to keeping not only the Canadian but also American and British vessels of the Coalition replenished so that the patrol and AAW picket sectors they occupied need not be vacated to proceed back into port. The 64 replenishments<sup>17</sup> she carried out while on patrol through October-December 1990 attest to this fact.



Protecteur replenishing USS Wisconsin in the Persian Gulf, 26 November 1990.

DND Photo


### Naval Operations During *DESERT STORM*

It was recognized that the transition to war would inevitably draw the Canadian Task Group (as well as the other Coalition forces) under the tactical control of the Americans. Once again arose the perennial concern of Canadian forces deployed in a coalition: Commodore Summers, with officials in Ottawa, was determined that the Canadian Task Group not be split off in different directions, but remain as an identifiable Canadian unit.

The opportunity to do just this, while still making a useful contribution to the Coalition war effort, came from the multinational character of that coalition and the USN concept of operations for war in the Gulf. The varied capabilities of the allied forces available, along with the range of 'strings attached' (the national restrictions on rules of engagement and operating area), meant that full integration with USN frontline forces would be a very difficult undertaking. In itself it was probably not worth the effort of an American staff more properly dedicated to the offensive against Iraq. The politics of maintaining the coalition, however, demanded that each of these allies be seen as an intricate part of the multinational effort, even if not actually involved in offensive operations (it tends to be forgotten that the MNF embargo continued through *DESERT STORM*). The compromise reached was that the Canadian Task Group Commander, while falling under the tactical control of the USN Arabian Gulf Battle Force Commander, would be responsible for the coordination of the bulk of non-frontline Coalition forces operating in the Persian Gulf.

This melded nicely with the USN concept of operations in the event of war in the Gulf, which envisioned carrier and support forces operating behind a protective destroyer and cruiser AAW/ASUW barrier (see Map 2). The majority of the non-USN coalition forces (with the notable exceptions of certain British, Dutch and Australian ships) were either incapable of forming part of that barrier, or else their national direction precluded their operation in the forward area, making their assignment to the support role a politically as well as militarily acceptable one. Thus came about the Combined Logistics Force, or CLF, encompassing naval forces from Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States.

The requirement for a separate force did not necessarily pre-ordain Canadian command of the CLF. Nor did the expressed



desire of the Canadians for an identifiable role. What did was past performance, familiarity with American tactical doctrine, and, perhaps most importantly, compatibility in communications with the USN. Many of the senior USN officers deployed knew their Canadian counterparts and had witnessed Canadian naval staffs perform commendably in such functions as ASW Warfare Commander in previous multinational operations, such as NATO exercises. The aggressive and professional conduct of MIF Ops had confirmed this. Moreover, the commonality in communications and codes on virtually every level (as required for the joint defence of North America), more complete than any of the other allied nations, meant 'connectivity' was assured.<sup>18</sup>

Command of and participation in the CLF was a task tailor-made for the Canadians. Despite the extensive upgrades prior to deployment, neither *Athabaskan* nor *Terra Nova* could take a spot in the AAW barrier: the emphasis had been on improved self-defence and neither ship could be classed as an area air defence 'missile-shooter' (the *Harpoon* fitted in *Terra Nova* is an anti-surface, not anti-air weapon). *Athabaskan*, however, was fitted out as a command flagship, and all three ships could sail with relative impunity in the reduced threat area behind the AAW barrier. Moreover, for probably the first time in our nation's military

history, the strange juxtaposition of French, British and American heritages which define Canada proved an advantage in bringing together a diverse group of coalition nations.

The demands of coordinating the logistics requirements of the Coalition naval effort, and assigning the escorts for the auxiliaries, challenged the abilities of the small Task Group staff. However, with a Canadian officer embarked in *USS Midway* to liaise with the Battle Force Commander, and with the pace of the actual operations quickly reaching a routine, the Combined Logistics Force functioned quite smoothly. Such changes as the progressive shift north of the carrier operating area (CVOA) and the evolving restrictions on the ships of the Western European Union (WEU) were quickly integrated. The scope of the effort can be judged from the fact that from its inception in early January until the end of operations on 1 March 1991, the CLF required a total of 105 escort taskings; of these, 36 were completed by the two Canadian destroyers, the remainder by Coalition vessels.<sup>19</sup>

Involvement in the Combined Logistics Force demonstrated the flexibility inherent in naval vessels, and more specifically the types operated by the Canadian Navy. Not only was *Athabaskan* properly outfitted to act as an effective command ship, but when the requirement arose for a ship to escort the *USS Princeton* to Bahrain after she struck a mine, *Athabaskan* was the logical choice, thanks to her self-defence systems, mine avoidance sonar, and embarked *Sea King* helicopters.<sup>20</sup> Although she did not carry helicopters, *Terra Nova* had some of the same attributes, and conducted more escorts through the Strait of Hormuz than any other warship. The two ships together were responsible for most of the escort taskings for the USN Hospital Ships *Comfort* and *Mercy* (the latter with a Canadian medical team embarked). For her part, *Protecteur* operated more as an Operational Support Ship than a mere tanker, and with her combined cargo of fuel, food and ammunition was ideally suited for special tasking in Operation *DESERT TURNPIKE*:<sup>21</sup> as the 'Outrider' tanker, she completed three replenishment cruises for the Coalition escorts assigned to that operation. In total she conducted 70 war-time replenishments of vessels from ten different nations.<sup>22</sup>

### Post-war Naval Operations

The cease-fire of 28 February found all three Canadian ships actively engaged in operations: *Athabaskan* providing close escort for US Hospital Ship *Comfort* off Kuwait; *Terra Nova* in a sector patrol guarding the eastern flank of the Carrier Operating Area; and *Protecteur* preparing to detach for what proved to be an abbreviated third and final *OUTRIDER* tasking. The disengagement of naval forces occurred much faster than anyone anticipated; on completion of their various commitments, the Task Group made for the Gulf port of Dubai to commence catching up on badly needed maintenance until the confusing situation and the status of the Multinational Interception Force was clarified. All three ships were alongside by 3 March.

Eventually the Canadian government determined that, with what appeared to be the virtual destruction of Iraq, the Canadian contribution to the MNF did not require the continued commitment of a full task group. On 7 March, the Minister of National Defence, Mr. Bill McKnight, and the Chief of Defence Staff, General John de Chastelain, were onboard the ships to announce that TG 302.3 would return to Canada forthwith. The ships sailed from Dubai on 12 March, exited the Strait of Hormuz that night (the first time in nearly six months for *Athabaskan*) and arrived in Halifax to grey skies but a rousing reception on 7 April 1991.

Canadian participation in the MNF did not suddenly come to an end, however. *HMCS Huron*, fitted-out in similar fashion to

*Athabaskan*, was deployed in the Persian Gulf from 23 April - 27 June 1991.<sup>23</sup> During that time, she conducted three MNF patrols in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman, operated for a short period with the *USS Nimitz*, entered Kuwait City harbour to support the re-opening of the Canadian Embassy there, and hosted the Maritime Commanders Conference of 7 June 1991. She returned to her home port of Esquimalt, having circumnavigated the globe, on 2 August 1991, ending a full year of Canadian naval association with the Persian Gulf.

### Conclusion

The success of the Gulf deployment was a major achievement for the Canadian Navy, confirming that within recognized limits a moderate size force can make a credible contribution. The virtual about-face in tactical emphasis (from ASW to ASUW, in an AAW environment), and the rapid and extensive refitting of the ships and helicopters to prepare for the Gulf deployment, demonstrate the inherent mission flexibility of the structure of Canada's naval forces. Indeed the mix is arguably that required to ensure a leading role in multinational operations in which a variety of forces would be cooperating. The variety of taskings undertaken, and the proficiency demonstrated in accomplishing them, form the basis of a proud new chapter in Canadian naval history.

### NOTES

1. The Standing Naval Force Atlantic, organized under NATO auspices, has been a visible demonstration of North Atlantic solidarity, but operates outside the UN and has had no real 'operations' to its credit. Again, without UN sanction, Canadian naval operations during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis do not apply.
2. For a summary of the Resolutions, see Jane Boulden and David Cox, *The Guide to Canadian Policies on Arms Control, Disarmament, Defence and Conflict Resolution 1991* (Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security: Ottawa, 1991), pp. 329-331. See also "The U.N. Resolutions: The Complete Text," in Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, *The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions* (Times Books: New York, 1991), pp. 137-156.
3. *The Guide*, p. 329.
4. *The Guide*, p. 223.
5. Canada, Office of the Prime Minister, "Speaking Notes for Prime Minister Brian Mulroney Press Conference, National Press Theatre August 10, 1990."
6. On the domestic political background, see Jocelyn Coulon (with Yvan Cliche), *La Dernière Croisade: la guerre du golfe et le rôle caché du Canada* (Médien: Montréal, 1992), and Charlotte Gray, "War Games," in *Saturday Night*, 106 (March 1991), pp. 10-14.
7. *USS Stark* was struck by an Iraqi *Mirage*-fired *Exocet* on 17 May 1987, with the loss of 37 of her crew; on 3 July 1988, *USS Vincennes* shot down an Iranian Airbus, killing all 290 passengers. Both incidents occurred in the Persian Gulf.
8. "U.N. Resolutions," *The Gulf War Reader*, p. 143.
9. Canada, *Orders-in-Council*, P.C. 1990-1995, 15 September 1990.
10. Canada, Office of the Prime Minister, "Speaking Notes for Prime Minister Brian Mulroney Press Conference, National Press Theatre, September 14, 1990."
11. See Norman Friedman, *Desert Victory: The War for Kuwait* (Annapolis, Md.: United States Naval Institute, 1991), pp. 69-70. Even the Royal Navy, despite its traditional patrol in the area, at this point was restricted to the waters of the southeast Gulf.
12. The French naval effort in the crisis focused on the strategic Bab-al-Mandeb, and was overseen by the French Indian Ocean area commander (ALINDIEN) headquartered in nearby Djibouti. For a general review of French naval activity, see Service d'information et de relations publiques de la Marine, *Marine et Guerre du Golfe, Août 1990 - Août 1991: une année d'opérations navales au Moyen-Orient* (Adim, 1992).

13. The threat of Iraqi retaliation for a boarding was ever-present, but it was also Coalition practice for political reasons to make as many as possible of the operations multinational. The Royal Navy extended its patrols to the Central Gulf in conjunction with the Canadians.
14. Lt(N) James Burrowes, "Patrolling the Gulf," in *Sentinel* (1990/6), p. 18.
15. CANFORCOMME Aide-Memoire 2 March 1991, "OP FRICTION - Facts and Figures." See also Friedman, pp. 71-72. *Marine*, p. 52 gives a different set of figures, possibly reflecting the fact that French activity, focused on the Strait of Bab el Mandeb chokepoint, was not included with the MNF totals.
16. "UN Resolutions," *Gulf War Reader*, p. 156.
17. *HMCS Protecteur* 1326-1 (AOR 509)(R2), 1 January 1991, "Annual Historical Report." The breakdown of Replenishments at Sea (RAS) by nation is as follows: 23 USN; 9 RN; 1 each French, Dutch, Australian; remainder Canadian.
18. On the NATO *TEAMWORK* exercises, and passing reference to Canadian participation in same, see Eric Grove, *Battle for the Fiords: NATO's Forward Maritime Strategy in Action* (London: Ian Allen Ltd, 1991). RCN cooperation with the USN during the Cuban Missile Crisis is examined in Joel J. Sokolsky, "Canada and the Cold War at Sea, 1945-68," in W.A.B. Douglas (ed.), *The RCN in Transition, 1910-1985* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1988), pp. 218-220.
19. "Op FRICTION - Facts and Figures," *op. cit.*
20. See "408 Bottles of Beer," in *Proceedings*, Vol. 117/12/1066 (December 1991), p. 71.
21. Operation DESERT TURNPIKE was the sealift protection counterpart to DESERT SHIELD. Although the tactical situation did not demand the close escort of shipping destined for southern Gulf ports, picket ships were deployed at several points along the route (see accompanying map) to provide protection if necessary.
22. The breakdown by nation is as follows: 28 USN; 14 Canadian; 8 Argentinean; 5 Norwegian; 4 Danish; 4 Spanish; 3 RN; 2 French; and one each Italy and the Netherlands. The only two Coalition navies not fuelled during the war were the Australian and the Belgian.
23. "The Deployment of *HMCS Huron* to the Persian Gulf," National Defence News Release, 26 March 1991 (AFN: 14/91). As this article is being written, *HMCS Restigouche* is on patrol in the Red Sea to further support the continuing embargo: "Canada Participates in Multinational Maritime Interception Force in the Middle East," Government of Canada News Release, 04 February 1992 (No. 28).

## THE CANADIAN PEACEKEEPER

*The Canadian Peacekeeper*, a new book by Colonel John Gardam, Project Director of the Peacekeeping Monument, will be presented to all peacekeepers who participate in the Peacekeeping Monument dedication ceremonies in Ottawa on 8 October 1992. In 27 chapters, the book covers all of the peacekeeping missions in which Canadians have participated from 1947 to 1992. The peacekeeping mission map reproduced at the front of this issue of *CDQ* is the centrefold of the book.

Also included with the book will be a full-colour poster depicting the ribbons of all peacekeeping medals — from Korea to Weestern Sahara — awarded to Canadian military personnel. This poster has been designed by Major G. Elms, a multi-toured peacekeeper on the staff of Peacekeeping Operations at NDHQ, and Mr. Bruce Beatty, who designed the Order of Canada, the Order of Military Merit, the Canadian Bravery Awards and other medals.

*The Canadian Peacekeeper* will go on sale in bookstores across Canada on 8 October. This bilingual book will be a valuable addition to peacekeeping literature, and will greatly assist Canadians in understanding this important element of Canadian military history. Additional information can be had from the publisher.

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