# REFLECTIONS ON CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY AND ITS UNDERLYING STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS

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**Introduction**

This article involves a critical reflection on the traditional nature of Canadian defence policy and the changed circumstances which call for a much improved definition of its conceptual basis; the article goes on to discuss underlying structural problems which will bar real progress until they are corrected.

The latest policy statement issued by the Department of National Defence in April 1992 represented a useful but overdue clarification of a changing orientation. As is too often the case in the Canadian political process, however, the document was unfortunately more of a rationalization of decisions already taken than a suitably thoughtful re-examination of the basis for future policy development and planning. It was the February 1992 budget, which unceremoniously chucked out one of the few substantive policy positions taken in the ministerial statement issued barely five months earlier, which demonstrated again the essential nature of defence policy development.

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Canada's approach to defence has been affected by many factors: the country's protracted political evolution and post-colonial sense of dependence, its vast expanse and remoteness, its physical contiguity with the world's most powerful state, and above all, our own peculiar political culture and its effect on how we govern ourselves. The formulation of explicit and detailed policy is never a simple or easy matter, and in some circumstances may not even be desirable; that, however, should be a matter of choice. Canadian defence policy, conversely, has probably never represented a deliberately chosen course of strategic direction, or a thoughtfully integrated element of national purpose and objectives.

In recent decades, the rigidities and set-piece character of the bi-polar confrontation limited the scope for imaginative policy, but these conditions did not preclude a clear definition of objectives supported by consistent policy application and decisional behaviour. Within the NATO community, Canadian defence policy statements have been notably infre-

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quent and vacuous, and the direction given defence has lacked focus. The history of the early Trudeau years, and the strong divisions that arose in cabinet from differences on defence, has been well recorded. Except for the 1964 and 1987 White Papers, the latter flawed and essentially still-born[1], policy updates for three decades have been incremental in nature and, usually, budget initiated. More than anything else, the approach has been to muddle on, it has been reactive and opportunistic, and politics have been a major determinant in its course.

### The Alliance

After four decades' participation in the Alliance, it should not be surprising that NATO had become overwhelmingly the central focus of most Canadian defence thinking. So much so that for many, means became confused with purpose. Other members of the Alliance, more clear-minded if not more politically mature, have tended to see NATO as an instrument for the furtherance of their national interests, rather than as a religion. In a sense, the NATO home ideally suited the nature of Canadian politics; it obviated the need for more independent thinking and action. When there was an inclination for independent action, as in the early 70s, it was neither developed constructively, nor sustained.

With the pace of political and strategic change, and the possible eclipse of the Alliance, Canada needs to address the larger issues of its vital interests, defence and related cooperation more purposefully and determinedly.

This is dictated not merely by ever changing international conditions. It represents an essential logical premise for defence planning and decision-making, in the absence of which the risk of significant waste of both effort and resources is very high. Indeed, a coherent policy is an essential expression of the nature, interests and objectives of the country. Dr. R.J. Sutherland, one of Canada's most original and lucid strategic thinkers, wrote some thirty years ago, "security and the protection of vital national interests remain for every nation a constant preoccupation of policy. It is also true that the very concept of national security implies a consistency of purpose and major policy extending over decades and even generations."[2]

The page has turned on a major era of modern history. A rapid and complex process of transition is under way, the ultimate results of which are uncertain. There are encouraging prospects of democracy in many areas of the world where it has not prevailed in the past, and the process of democratization in Eastern Europe is having visible effects in other areas of the world where totalitarian or one-party systems have prevailed. However, the senseless bloodshed and destruction visited upon what was Yugoslavia is but one manifestation of the difficult ethnic, political and economic problems released by the collapse of the Soviet empire. The world is faced with new instabilities and risks. Fortunately, these do not affect Canada directly, nor do they entail the same degree of risk as the Cold War.

Given recent history it would be only natural ardently to wish for the survival of NATO and to be swept up by schemes devised to that end. More appropriate, however, is to examine how suited it remains to much changed circumstances and, indeed, whether it is likely to survive the Europeanization of defence in Europe.[3]

The Alliance has been an enormous success. It also ushered in a regime of cooperation such as never existed in Europe before. In its absence, Monet and Schuman's dream of a united Europe might not have taken shape. Yet, the circumstances that led to NATO's creation no longer exist. The Alliance's focus shifted increasingly to its politics over the years, and as with most large institutions, it became increasingly bureaucratic, self-absorbed and driven. European institutions, old and new, such as the WEU, the EC, and CSCE (which includes Canada and the United States) have evolved. Competition to NATO's traditional primacy in the defence field, already working in the open, accelerated and was indirectly acknowledged even in the communiqué of the Heads of Government meeting in Rome in November 1991.

Within NATO, strong divisive forces had long been at work. French attitudes have long bordered on schizophrenia, favouring American commitment as a guarantee of West European security and German good behaviour while, at the same time, bitterly resenting US dominance. For Germany, this ambivalence has represented a constant and awkward pull between a strong Franco-German axis, which has been the main pillar of its reconciliation and European construction policies, and the US as the ultimate guarantor of its security during the Cold War. Not surprisingly, some observers view the planned (and denounced in some NATO quarters) formation of a joint army corps between the two countries as a French stratagem for, at minimum, wresting control of European defence from the United States, if not the latter from the former. The relative wane of CSCE and the gains of WEU were a natural consequence, given the former's size, but given also the strength of ameriphobia in France and elsewhere, and the convoluted ways of European diplomacy.[4]

Europeans have served notice that arrangements for the security of their region will be of their own choosing, and already, "NATO's role has changed from a *dominant one to one complementary to other* institutional arrangements serving *European security and unity*."[5] (Author's italics) Even the United Kingdom, by far the United States' staunchest European ally, has called for the US to deal with Europe as an equal, rather than expect its members to fall into line automatically with decisions taken in Washington. Without doubt, the preservation of the Alliance will continue to suit the interests of many of its members for some time, but for how long? European security has evident implications for North America, but with key European members taking an ever stronger and more narrowly regional approach to matters of their own defence and related cooperative instruments, it is reasonable to ask how long increasingly European centred and controlled arrangements, combined with fundamentally changed conditions, will remain relevant or should involve North American member states.

There are good reasons for the growing independence and confidence seen in Europe:

- The most obvious is the end of the Cold War;
- The range of new risks that now loom in the uncertain future are of a lower order, and more spatially contained or delimited (barring, of course, the involvement of nuclear devices in any regional conflict);
- In its own interest, and though not explicitly at first, the unified Germany will find itself drawn to lending its much increased weight to the security and stability of recently freed states on its eastern perimeter. It will also constitute a formidable new bulwark in Central Europe which will reinforce the sense of territorial security of Western Europe;
- Major reductions in the US and Soviet strategic and tactical nuclear arsenals, and the expected dismantling and non-proliferation of CIS nuclear systems will gradually lead to a much enhanced nuclear security outlook. The independent deterrents of the UK and France, which could not offset the Soviet nuclear threat during the Cold War, will be more important in relative terms.

NATO combines experience and credibility, and for many it remains the best guarantor of a stable balance of power in Europe. For many countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet states, it is also seen as an effective control on Germany. Notwithstanding the basis for this view, however, this vestigial role of the Alliance may turn it into an increasingly unattractive alternative to post-war generations of Germans who do not relish the burden of past guilt. There is as well a sense of abandonment and disillusionment in some East European states that had hoped to find a new security home in an expanded Alliance.[6]

As Europeans insist on redefining the Alliance, it is fair to ponder what capacity it will have for significant initiative in the absence of insistent US leadership. Its protracted embarrassment and averted gaze in the face of the most brutal and crudest of wars on its immediate periphery are evident. Equally significant, what collective concern and action Europeans have manifested or taken before the Yugoslav conflict initially found expression through the EC rather than NATO. There is thus reason to believe that with the removal of an overwhelming and direct threat to all, as presented by the super-armed Soviet hegemon, for instance, the Alliance will become an increasingly lame instrument owing to most of its members' preference for more European instruments, and the ever elusive solidarity of a host of individualistic nations whose interests and attitudes remain so varied — notwithstanding dramatic progress in political and economic cooperation.

Interposed between the two nuclear superpowers, Canada's main threat from the Cold War was that of a nuclear exchange between the two. That risk provided a logical basis to a contribution to deterrence at the locus of the East-West confrontation and was the basis of Canadian defence strategy and presence in Europe. But, an uncritical and generalized identification of the changing Alliance with Canadian security requirements in the post-Cold War era —

which has tended to persist — is much less evident. Though Europe represents an international pole in terms of political and economic matters, Canadian interests range more broadly, and trade with Europe has continued to decline in relative importance. The evolution of the EC in the post 1992 era also suggests a further distancing of Europe from North America. One might counter, with reason, that as a trans-Atlantic bridge, the Alliance thus becomes more important. Perhaps.

On the other hand, Canada has significant trade and political relations with other regions of the world whose security per se has not been of such concern.

This is not an argument to leave the Alliance. On the contrary, continued membership undoubtedly remains in the Canadian interest, at least for the time being. But, the form of our participation should more visibly serve **our own** real interests and security needs. In particular, any notions of further or future involvement in European security contingency plans should be addressed more critically and realistically in view of our remoteness and quite modest military capabilities, especially now that a case for the necessity of external assistance to Europe (excepting, of course, US extended deterrence) can no longer be made.

### What Underpinnings for Canadian Policy?

For a long time Canadian commentators continued to view stationing of Canadians forces a continent away on foreign soil as a normal state of affairs which, of course, it never was. During most of the Cold War, Canada would have been in the indefensible and probably unique position of having minimal military resources left at home had it been required to react to a heightened alert state and maximize the readiness of forces committed to a hodge-podge of missions abroad, none of which could be discharged properly. Characterizations of policy as either internationalist or continentalist, one good and the other bad, have not been helpful. They have tended to be a substitute for more rigorous analysis. It is noteworthy that in nearly all comment which deplored the announced withdrawal of the Stationed Task Force from Europe, for example, the impression left was that this was the last important Canadian NATO mission when, in fact, the Maritime Command role persists in the North Atlantic, which has represented a far more important contribution to NATO strategy.

The slogan-like suggestion that a military presence on the ground in Europe was the price of 'a seat at the table' was more self-serving than convincing. Over ninety thousand Canadians lie in European military cemeteries who died to liberate Europe twice in this century, and we returned again in the 50s when really needed. Canada has unquestionably earned her seat at the table, and no one should be allowed to forget it, here or in Europe!

Two related themes have consistently and uncritically been associated with the Canada's defence policy: the theme of influence, and the notion of involvement in Europe as a counterweight to an otherwise too intense, and presumably threatening relationship with the United States.

Influence has been nearly an obsession with many commentators, who seem to ignore that it can only result from tangible factors. Our modest power and security reliance on the United States, a weak record in the Alliance over the last two decades which includes repeated reductions of commitments without consultation, a bogus 1987 White Paper, our indebtedness and well known economic and political problems — these are all-too-tangible factors which should leave us under no illusions as to the real measure of our credibility and influence. Interestingly, although we did make a significant contribution to European security when it was really needed in the early years of the Alliance, in all major policies areas where our interests have diverged from those of our European friends, our 'influence' seems to have been rather elusive. Apparently, gratitude is not an element of international relations.

Thus, as even American influence wanes on issues involving major European interests and concerns, the notion of any Canadian influence is more delusive and presumptuous than real. Be that as it may, more substantive and realistic objectives must drive our external relations and security policies.

The notion of involvement in NATO as an offset to a highly asymmetrical and constraining relationship with the United States has enjoyed wide currency. The benefits of a diversification of political relations and especially of trade, are self-evident. In this instance, however, the implication has been that undefined harm has somehow been mitigated through

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the kind of involvement we have had in NATO. North America is nominally a region of NATO, but its defence has been a bilateral matter between Canada and the United States. Our role in NATO has surely extended the range of our relations as such, but it is much less certain that it has substantively changed the nature of the large number of bilateral matters we have always necessarily transacted directly with our neighbour. The two-way trade between the two countries is the largest in the world, and the US takes over 75 percent of our exports! It is an inevitable fact of Canadian life that both the magnitude and importance of these links dwarf all others. Besides, while it admittedly does pose challenges, the relationship is not that between Finland and the former Soviet Union.

Dr. Sutherland wrote that one of the 'invariants' of Canadian defence strategy is her geography. A corollary of that postulate would be that one of Canada's most vital interests is to be taken somewhat more seriously in Washington. While Canadian defence cooperation is bound to be of lessened importance in the foreseeable future, the vast, contiguous country to their north will necessarily remain of major strategic — as well as economic and political — importance to the United States. Dr. Joel Sokolsky has offered thoughtful comment on this larger question.[7] It remains vital to our interests not only that we be a reliable and important contributor to hemispheric security, but, equally , that we be seen as a country with a clear and consistent notion of and committed to its real interests. The relationship calls for clear mindedness, consistency and firmness, not obsequiousness.

Throughout its life, the Alliance's focus was excessively Euro-centric, and Canada's defence thinking, on the whole, has had too much of a European orientation. Too much was made of Canada's obligations vis-à-vis European security, rather than Western security. Canada's huge hinterland and perimeter are vastly greater than those of any European power. In securing her own immediate areas of responsibility, which was at best done marginally (and with US subsidization), Canada contributed to Western and European security, particularly when North American hemispheric security was of vital concern to the United States whose extended deterrence was so crucial to Europe. It is interesting to note that immediately the Cold War ended, many Canadians assumed there was no longer any need for armed forces. It would be understandable for the Canadian public to have a weak sense of the relevance of its Forces. For so long, they have been conditioned to believe that our most capable units belonged to European defence, that our defence obligations derived from NATO obligations rather than from our own security needs and interests, an argument taken to silly lengths at times by diffident politicians.[8]

### The Policy Environment

Past weakness in policy articulation and management cannot be imputed to a lack of sound strategic and policy analysis here at home. Perhaps, some of the published policy analysis has tended to be too uncritically accepting of conventional wisdom; a degree of inhibition may result from public subsidization of the discipline. The greater problem, however, is that too little, if any, of the excellent extra-governmental analysis of Canadian and international security finds its way into policy development. This is a serious shortcoming in the Canadian process that is increasingly out of keeping with the times, that is its internal-

ized and closed character. In this respect, it is, unfortunately, only a reflection of a larger structural problem which affects the Canadian political system and machinery.

Given the desperate financial problems which afflict the country, it was astounding, for example, that neither the Ministerial statement of September 1991, nor the February 1992 budget which modified it, contained any imaginative or substantive plan to improve efficiency and achieve savings in the Forces. Reductions in size do not necessarily lead to greater efficiency as implied by the earlier statement; the contrary may well be the case if not accompanied by other measures.

Discounting the Pennefather Management Review of 1972, which addressed primarily headquarters organizations (and whose prescriptions engendered other problems), the CF and Department have not been subjected to independent review since the Glasco Commission. Canadian defence is overdue for a comprehensive and independent 'hard look' from the standpoint of a unified Force which has drifted somewhat from the spirit of the 1966 Canadian Forces Reorganization Act. Such a review is also needed in light of the aftermath of the Cold War, the reality that we no longer have large forces permanently stationed abroad, and not least because of decreasing funds and personnel strength, excessive infrastructure and, possibly, support 'tail'. And, such a comprehensive re-examination is overdue because the driving concepts, at best, have had no more than incremental adjustment for decades.

This is not to single out the Canadian Forces as an organization prone to waste. Such is not the case. Military forces, on the other hand, are exceptionally costly to man, equip and train. A systematic review could produce important economies that could lead to greater operational capability for given expenditures, and probably help with the calamitous national debt. The call for an independent review does not imply a lack of discernment or capacity for sound analysis within National Defence, even though it is a fact that strong bureaucratic and institutional factors make critical self-review much more difficult in the public than in the private sector, where the consequences of the bottom line and pressures of the marketplace impose a discipline of their own. The key issue is that in a democracy, particularly where large, costly national institutions are involved, it is healthy and necessary for public confidence to entrust major, periodic re-assessments to external resources. And there is growing evidence that public confidence needs restoration.

It is not the fault of Canadian Forces personnel that we probably have the most costly forces in the world, that the measurable operational capability produced for the funds expended is low by comparison with any other country. This is due to several factors:

- The very high cost of an all volunteer, career-oriented force as currently structured and sustained, in which even untrained personnel accede to career status, for practical purposes;
- The propensity of Canadian defence R & D and procurement for re-inventing the wheel, seeking esoteric and uniquely Canadian solutions to what are usually common operational problems, as well as other burdens which impact procurement such as offsets, industrial and regional development, micro management and endless processes, their resulting bureaucracies and politicization (some of which the Auditor General has identified);[9]
- The high cost of excessive infrastructure, overlapping and large headquarters and staffs;
- A loose policy environment that condones a wide range of activity and training that may not all be essential, or conducted most economically;
- The absence of a delegated financial management system that encourages cost control and frugality in all activity areas;
- Finally, and most importantly, an absence of sustained and purposeful political leadership.

In an article critical of defence management, C.R. Nixon, one of the Department's former deputy ministers, wrote: "There is a political vacuum on defence. The Canadian public is apathetic on the subject. The major media have not shown any deep or continuing interest in defence. Until those conditions change, the future of Canada's defence capability rests almost solely on defence management officials."[10] That such a statement failed to attract notice, let alone generate lively and extensive public discussion, was both revealing and rather discouraging.

The absence of political leadership is the most serious problem as it is, basically, responsible for all others. It compounds weaknesses in policy direction, of which it is also the cause. In the absence of a lucid and coherent policy framework combined with strong political leadership, there is a significant risk that the orientation and management of defence will be shaped more by internal forces, including institutionally based perceptions of requirements, which can conflict with genuine national needs, or interests. This phenomenon is an inherent characteristic of the behaviour of all large institutions, especially those with so strong a sense of their own mission.

In Canada, this problem has been compounded by two major events. The first involved the unification of the three Armed Services, the great deal of emotion and misunderstanding involved, and the manner of implementation of the policy. Combined with simultaneous budgetary reductions, it triggered strong institutional survival reflexes which have lived on. A traumatic experience for the Forces, unification engendered considerable organizational turmoil and internal stresses. Time gradually overcame most of these difficulties, and by 1984 the Forces enjoyed growing internal cohesion, which healthy trend was arrested, if not reversed, by the government's ordered introduction of distinctive 'environmental' uniforms in what remained in law a unified Force.

The second event involved the merger in 1972 of the two formerly separate departmental and Canadian Forces headquarters. Important benefits resulted in financial planning, procurement, military/civilian cooperation, and, probably, compensation and benefits for the military. The perceived problem of conflicting advice which Donald McDonald was

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them sweeping powers. Because they are often not around long enough to know what they are doing, or to be held accountable for what they have or have not done, some ministers, in fact, show very limited interest in the non-political dimensions of their departments.

Planning horizons are short, and in the superheated political atmosphere that prevails, political factors have increasingly superseded technical ones. All major government program decisions and expenditures are made by small committees of ministers in a closed process in which the national interest often competes with the political interests of the governing party, the two not being the same! This is, by far, the most serious conflict of interest to be found in Ottawa. The operation of the system is the object of disparaging comments by foreign observers, as well as a source of cynicism, a sense of futility and poor morale in the Public Service which is its captive instrument.

Frustrated from playing its essential role, Parliament is relegated to that of a contrived and irrelevant sideshow. Though a crucial function devolves to its committees in the detailed and purposeful examination of legislation and appropriations, much of committee work, unfortunately, is little more than an exercise in stage-managed futility, owing to archaic rules and, particularly, the yoke of party discipline. (Departmental witnesses, for example, appear before committees representing their ministers and to convey the "party line", not to answer questions candidly on the basis of any expertise they may have.) For practical purposes, there is no check on or accountability required of the executive — between elections, at least. Another contrast with the US system, notwithstanding its own weaknesses, ours lacks transparency, and much effort is made to keep it that way. Manipulation of public perception and opinion has become a substitute for leadership and made communications the dominant day-to-day concern of government.

Members of Parliament enjoy a unique vantage point and well know the problems of a system which, in so many ways, devalues their own role in it. Yet, they desist from any collective action which could compel necessary reform. Whether imputable to vested interest or other factors, their passivity is

said to have objected to — of actual benefit to the political authority, one would have thought — was certainly overcome. The resulting environment in fact developed into the opposite of one which fosters the searching, open conflict of ideas that is both healthy and necessary to bring out all of the alternatives to the solution of often complex and multi-faceted problems. There also resulted an increasingly unwieldy, bureaucratic structure and culture that have sustained inflated staffs and, in particular, led to a serious blurring of statutory responsibility and accountability, inevitably generating consequential tensions, and also led to a growth of informal power accruing to ensconced bureaucracies. Importantly, this organization has also thwarted the evolution of a necessary, disciplined, unified military staff system[11]

### The Political Dimension

Fundamentally, the underlying problem affecting defence devolves from a larger one than that identified by Mr. Nixon. It is the consequence of the political culture that has evolved in Canada, of political institutions that have become ineffectual as a result, and of their effect on the whole function of government. Partisan politics and related concerns are the major force driving activity in Ottawa. Ministers' lives are monopolized by various concerns and priorities which accord too little importance to their operational responsibilities; their perspectives are political rather than operational. They are at best very part-time chief executives of often complex departments, and the factors that bear on their appointments as ministers seldom have anything to do with their fitness for the responsibilities they inherit and over which law gives

further evidence of the paralysing grip of a bankrupt culture. Extensive patronage and other corruptive practices continue to flourish in this closing decade of the 20th century which offend contemporary standards of integrity and accountability. The essence of the problem is vividly illustrated at the very apex of government: a cabinet of 38 ministers which over eight years preached restraint, curtailed public services and froze salaries, itself set the worst example of self-serving featherbedding to the whole of government and the country. Government represents an increasingly shocking contrast with the ever rising efficiency necessary to succeed in the private sector's competitive environment in order to finance the former. It is a condition the severity of which has taken long to come home to Canadians at large partly on account of a press — an essential element of a functioning democracy — which lacks the vigour evident in most other democracies.

## Conclusion

The thrust of this essay is not that our defence effort of the last forty years has been entirely wrongheaded. Much we got right, especially in the early years of NATO. Much effort was also wasted in later years, through injudicious commitment of forces and their fragmentation over too many missions, failure to adjust to changing conditions, and the pursuit of such goals as influence! Our approach has reflected a Canadian penchant for wanting to be all things to all people, instead of a deliberate and consistent strategy directed by a sharply defined view of our own interests and objectives. The changed strategic and political environments now offer unprecedented freedom to achieve focus, the lack of which has resulted in unnecessary costs and many instances of dubious effectiveness in the past.

The frequent weakness of policy in Ottawa, and its poor management in the defence sector, is but a reflection of the larger problem that undermines the soundness and efficacy of the Federal Government. The history of nations is marked by rhythms and cycles. The great danger is that ours will be suffocated before reaching adulthood by the incompetence and deadweight of government. The coincidence of major problems affecting the cohesion and structural integrity of the country, its economy and productive sectors, together with increasingly evident deficiencies in political institutions and leadership, has to represent the gravest crisis Canada has experienced. Canadians bear a collective responsibility for much that has gone wrong, and there are no ready or easy solutions at hand.

The kind of spirit urged by President John F. Kennedy in his inaugural address would be particularly timely for Canadians. The most hopeful development, perhaps, is that the traditional political apathy of the long suffering, silent majority of Canadians is giving way to growing anger. It is a healthy development that points to greater public involvement, to expectations that will no longer tolerate the ways of the past, and to the demand for more responsible stewardship on the part of their elected representatives. The political class will ignore this development at its peril. □

## NOTES

1. The 1987 White Paper would have been impressive in 1975, but in 1987 its thrust and tone seemed odd in that while no one could foretell the imminent collapse of the Soviet Empire, the latter's serious structural problems were much more evident and the threat somewhat less ominous. More specifically, the policy callously abandoned Norway, the all-important and vulnerable flank of NATO, where Canada's commitments mattered and were important, to increase commitments in the best defended region of NATO where they had become irrelevant militarily. On the whole, it was just too much for anyone to believe who had an appreciation of the real costs of the plans put forward, combined with realism before the crushing and runaway public debt, that the government doubtfully could or indeed seriously intended to follow through with its policy.
2. R.J. Sutherland, "Canada's Long Term Strategic Situation", *International Journal,* XVII, Summer 1962.
3. Willem Van Eekelen, "The Western European Union in the Emerging European Security Architecture", *Canadian Defence Quarterly,* February 1992.
4. See Alexander Moens, 'Canada's Trans-Atlantic and European Security Policy: Time to Adjust', *Canadian Defence Quarterly,* June 1992. A very senior European several times referred to SACEUR, in private conversation with the author, as the "American pro-consul".
5. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Kurt Biedenkopf and Motoo Shiina, "Global Cooperation After the Cold War: A Reassessment of Trilateralism"; The Trilateral Commission, July 1991.
6. Only slightly dated by the frenetic pace of events, see David Haglund, "Being There: North America and the Variable Geometry of European Security", *International Journal,* Winter 1990-91, for a detailed and informative discussion. For a more recent and briefer discussion of institutional evolution and turmoil in Europe see Dr. Scot Robertson: "Western Europe in the Post-Cold War Era", *Canadian Defence Quarterly,* December 1992.
7. Joel J. Sokolsky, "The Future of North American Defence Cooperation", *International Journal,* vol. XLVI, no. 1, Winter 1990-91; and, "Canada-U.S. Defence Cooperation in a 'Unipolar' World", *Defence Associations National Network News,* Vol 1, No. 15, Ottawa, 15 April 1992.
8. For example, ascribing to NATO 'obligations' cruise missile testing, low-level SAC flights, NATO low-level flying in Goose Bay, etc.., rather than defending them as sound and appropriate contributions to our own and mutual security.
9. A viable defence industry is essential not only to meet some of the equipment needs of the Forces, but in so doing, spur high technology , skills and technology transfer to other sectors and contribute to employment. If nurtured selectively in areas of excellence, the industry can succeed internationally (as it must, Canadian procurement being so small), its exports offsetting inevitable defence procurement abroad. Conversely, undiscriminating domestic production involving small, one-time programs, leads to excessive costs, and creates one-contract companies that subsequently fail or become dependencies. A pioneer of offsets policies, Canada has helped the excessive fragmentation and domestication of defence procurement in western countries, undermining the comparative advantage benefits of international trade, resulting in higher costs for everyone in a sector in which costs are already too high, and often poorer products for the end user.
10. C.R. Nixon, "Point of View - V", *The Defence Associations National Network News,* Vol 1, No. 12, 15 July 1991.
11. A reorganization of the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff group in 1992, prompted by budgetary reductions, has the potential to bring much needed improvement to the quality and responsiveness of staff support to the Chief of the Defence Staff.