The Lasting Injury: The Revenue Marine’s First Steam Cutters

Robert M. Browning, Jr.

Adapted from The American Neptune, 1992

Robert M. Browning, Jr., received his M. A. in maritime history from East Carolina University in 1980 and his Ph.D. from the University of Alabama in 1988. Dr. Browning served as curator at the battleship Texas for two years. He is currently chief historian for the United States Coast Guard.

Note also that a more extensive list of vessels and builders is avaialable on our page "U.S.C.G. Cruising Cutters Built or Acquired Before 1915" which includes vessels from other government agencies.

The quest for technology is as old as mankind itself. History is filled with great inventions and their impact on society. The failures, however, are often forgotten or dismissed. In the 1840s, with steam propulsion increasing in popularity as a method to propel ships, the U.S. Revenue Marine Service built eight steam vessels. Most were built with innovative machinery and propulsion systems. Nonetheless, the building program was a disaster. None of the ships worked well, they were exorbitantly expensive, and all were converted, sold, or transferred to other services within several years of their commissioning. The quest for innovation and progress, in this case, ended in complete failure.

The adoption of steam by the Revenue Marine, a forerunner of the Coast Guard, appeared to be sound. Steamers could perform some tasks better than sailing vessels, making the enforcement of revenue laws easier. Steam propulsion would allow the service to patrol narrow waters better, and vessels with auxiliary power could combat strong currents and unfavorable winds. The department believed that steamers would be useful in the Gulf of Mexico and could help combat smuggling in the Great Lakes, which by the 1840s was being conducted by steamers. [fn 1]

As the Revenue Marine considered building steamers, both the horizontal paddle wheel and the screw propeller had recently been introduced as methods to propel ships. The more unusual method by far was the horizontal wheel. William W. Hunter, a lieutenant in the United States Navy, patented this invention in 1841. The wheels lay horizontal to the bottom of the ship, side-by-side, and moved within drum casings with a vertical shaft. Few blades of the wheel protruded beyond the side of the specially designed bell-shaped hull in order not to push the water around the cylinder — only a two-inch clearance was allowed between the drums and the blades. For war purposes, this idea had merit. The machinery and wheels were not exposed to shot, and the wheels, which lay below the waterline, were not affected by heavy seas as readily as those of side-wheel vessels. Furthermore, according to Hunter, the vessel could be used as an icebreaker since the wheels lay below ice levels in most rivers. [fn 2]

In 1841, Hunter built a small prototype steamer in Norfolk named Germ. Fifty-two feet long, eleven feet wide, and drawing only two feet of water, she made over eight knots on her trial trip near Norfolk. Hunter took her to the Great Lakes and then to Baltimore, demonstrating her capacity to serve along the coast and in the interior waters. She became the first steamer to pass from the Atlantic to Lake Erie via the canals and return to the East Coast. [fn 3]

These trials impressed a large number of people. The Commandant of the Norfolk Navy Yard, William B. Shubrick, said that the vessel was ". . . among the greatest triumphs of American genius." Hunter offered his invention to the Revenue Marine Service in December 1841, arguing that it "would be economical and usefully employed ... ." He claimed that a small steamer similar to Germ could be built for $4,500, would use only five dollars’ worth of fuel a day, and could be run by two or three men. Secretary of the Treasury Walter Forward answered Hunter four days later, telling him that the department had no interest. [fn 4]

Undaunted, Hunter convinced the Navy Department of the usefulness of his invention, and the Navy built the steamship Union, commissioning her in early 1843. The Navy also contracted for the building of the iron-hulled gunboat Michigan for the Great Lakes, laying the keel in 1842. The Navy’s progress with these ships elicited interest in the new technology from other government agencies. In February, the new Secretary of the Treasury, John C. Spencer, instructed Captain William A. Howard to prepare two models for iron-hulled steam revenue cutters.

Iron-hulled steamships had definite advantages in a service in which the vessels saw much active duty. Captain Howard determined that iron hulls would not rot or sustain damage from marine borers, that they would be stronger than wood, and that repairing them would cost 50 percent less than repairing wooden ships of the same size over a twenty-year period. [fn 5]

Howard also scrutinized several propulsion systems. He favored the screw propeller system of Swedish inventor John Ericsson. Ericsson’s propellers had six blades. Each blade had a helicoidal twist and was supported by a cast brass hub. A copper band around the blades gave additional support. By 1843, at least forty-five vessels had already adopted Ericsson’s screw. [fn 6]

On 17 April, the department advertised its intention to build steamships. The estimated cost was less than $50,000, and the builders had five months to deliver the engines and six months for the hulls. Three days later, Howard hastily offered Hunter and Ericsson contracts for their propulsion systems to be placed in steamers of approximately four hundred tons. [fn 7]

The department signed contracts for six vessels, four on Hunter’s patent, Spencer, Bibb, Dallas, and McLane, and two with Ericsson’s screw propeller, Legare and Jefferson. The six ships were to be as similar as possible, built on similar plans, with the same boilers and nominal horsepower. Ericsson quietly told Spencer that he intended to deviate from the department’s plan by building the cylinder to require about fifty pounds of pressure, which would generate the horsepower stipulated. Ericsson built cylinders that measured thirty-six inches in diameter with a two-foot, eight-inch stroke, while Hunter’s measured twenty-four inches in diameter and had a three-foot stroke. [fn 8]

On 4 May, Spencer appointed Captain Howard to superintend the construction of the new vessels. This appointment placed Howard in an awkward position. Spencer had created the position of Chief of the Bureau in order to centralize control, appointing Captain Alexander Fraser to this position. Eleven years earlier, Fraser, who was now chief, had been Captain Howard’s second lieutenant on board the revenue cutter Alert. [fn 9] Now Howard would have to report to Fraser in matters regarding the construction of the steamers.

Howard showed some reservations about Hunter’s wheel. He suggested changes and considered Hunter unqualified to direct the building of the ships. On 23 May, Howard boarded Union for a trial cruise. In smooth water she made about nine knots and sailed "remarkably fast both under canvas and steam." At the end of the day, Howard was a new convert to the Hunter wheel. During the trial, Hunter and Howard talked candidly and agreed that the vessel had some faults, particularly in the boilers, but concluded that alterations in the revenue cutters would be possible. "Fully convinced" of the soundness of the horizontal wheel, Howard wrote to Spencer that he would "proceed to build the four vessels ... with all possible despatch." [fn 10] Howard’s new-found enthusiasm for the Hunter wheel would be something that he and others would regret for decades.

With the Treasury Department’s approval, Lieutenant Hunter began making alterations in the dimensions and arrangements of engines and hulls. Meanwhile, Spencer reminded Howard that Lieutenant Hunter’s directions were to be followed, thus relegating Howard to a position in which he merely saw that the materials were of the "proper quality and that the workmanship... [was] faithfully performed." Hunter arrived in New York in mid-July with a new model and concluded that the proposed changes were "great improvements. [fn 11]

Howard’s enthusiasm for Hunter’s invention waned once the construction commenced. Howard began suggesting changes, but the new Secretary of the Treasury, George M. Bibb, felt that if the department deviated from Hunter’s plans, Hunter might "divest" himself of the responsibility and “transfer the accountability" onto the Treasury Department if the ships failed. [fn 12]

During the winter and spring, Howard chafed under Hunter’s tutelage but remained busy traveling from city to city in an attempt to supervise the construction of the ships. Hunter’s Spencer and Ericsson’s Legare were the first two ships to be completed, and the department decided to test both models to determine which method of propulsion was better. During the final stages of construction, and before trials were held, Howard began to speak publicly in favor of Ericsson’s steamer Legare. Hunter protested Howard’s actions, and Secretary Bibb removed the captain from supervision of Spencer. Bibb placed Captain Fraser in command of Spencer in order to ensure a fair trial. [fn 13]

Before Spencer was completed, Legare raced the British side-wheeler Great Western. On 20 July 1844 Legare, with her sails furled, and Great Western, with hers set, raced eighteen miles from New York to Sandy Hook. The Great Western, with a half-mile head start and the aid of her sails, finished one mile behind Legare. [fn 14]

Legare had proved she was ready for her trials and had made "repeated" tests while Spencer lay idle. Therefore, once Spencer was ready, Fraser permitted Lieutenant Hunter to test his machinery before both vessels were tried together. During the month of August, Spencer ran up and down the Hudson River at about six knots but experienced problems with her shafts, which caused the wheel wells to fill with water. Replacing one of the shafts took nearly four weeks. [fn 15]

In September, Captain Fraser ordered the two steamers to hold trials running from New York Harbor up Long Island Sound. On a twenty-mile course, Spencer steamed no faster than she had on her shakedown cruises, and Ericsson’s Legare, traveling at about seven knots, beat her by forty-one minutes. After several days of tests the ships headed south again, Spencer having consumed about one thousand pounds of coal each hour during the last leg of the trip. [fn 16]

Captain Fraser realized immediately that Spencer needed major alterations. During the trials, several parts of the machinery wore out, the boiler and the throttle valve worked improperly, and the brickwork arches in the boiler settled. Hunter claimed that improvements could be made, but these trials convinced the department that steamships with submerged wheels and propellers were not as useful as ordinary sailing vessels. [fn 17]

During the trials, Spencer had proved to be unstable under sail. Secretary Bibb asked Howard to make alterations to improve the Hunter-built ships. Fraser suggested that the masts of Spencer be reduced, along with the spars and canvas, "to insure the ship’s safety." After some study, Howard reported that "there is no alteration that will increase her speed..." [fn 18]

By the fall of 1844, both Fraser and Howard realized that Hunter’s vessels were failures. Allowing the designers of the engines to design the hulls as well proved to be a major mistake, as was permitting Lieutenant Hunter to make alterations on the wheels and machinery of his vessels. Howard felt he could no longer sit idle, and he began an immediate and personal campaign to interfere with the construction of the unfinished vessels. Shortly after the trials, he began to lobby for the conversion of the Hunter wheel steamers to side-wheel propulsion. Howard also intervened directly in the construction of George M. Bibb and had work discontinued on Dallas until spring, ostensibly because of the winter weather. [fn 19]

While the fate of the Hunter wheel vessels hung in the balance, Legare steamed to Key West for revenue duty under Captain Henry B. Nones. Nones was reminded to conserve fuel and to rely "mainly upon the canvas ... ." Nones started the trip with enthusiasm, but in less than three weeks his opinion of Legare had changed tremendously. He complained that she was over-sparred and feared that the boiler would burst. The engines had so little power that Nones stated that if he was "so unfortunate to be caught on a lee shore, even in a moderate gale, I must inevitably be lost... ." [fn 20]

Spencer operated along the East Coast during the winter and experienced many difficulties. The boiler leaked severely after only three months’ service. The vessel had no bilge pump amidships, which forced the men to bail and hoist scores of barrels of water out of the hold. In heavy seas and bad weather, this was impossible. In February, Spencer was tasked to steam to the assistance of vessels gone ashore off Barnagat Beach, but a month later a board of officers condemned her and suggested propellers as an alternate source of propulsion. [fn 21]

With Spencer a proven failure, Howard again began to deprecate Hunter and his invention. Fraser also expressed his negative views on Bibb, then being built in Pittsburgh. The machinery occupied forty feet of the midships section of the steamer, which complicated the placement of the coal bunkers and the masts. It took up so much space that, in order to leave room for fuel, the accommodations for the captain were placed on the spar deck. Fraser pointed out to the Secretary of the Treasury that two vessels of similar size being built for the Mexican government in New York had only twenty-six feet of machinery space. [fn 22]

Howard, who had pleaded for a change in propulsion, became desperate for some action and exceeded his authority. In October 1844, he had recommended to Secretary Bibb that McLane be changed to side-wheel propulsion. If done before completion, such a change would cost $4,000. Secretary Bibb responded in mid-February 1845 that a great sum of money had been spent on Hunter’s plan and that he intended to try it fairly before condemning it and making another "large outlay ... for alterations." [fn 23] The secretary, however, left office, and Howard took advantage of this change to take Hunter’s wheels out of McLane. In April, less than a month after the change in secretaries, Hunter informed the department that the wheels had been taken out of the steamer and that the sides had been planked over. The new Secretary of the Treasury, Robert Walker, asked for an "explicit and immediate explanation." [fn 24]

Howard answered that he had been anxious to change the propulsion of McLane before the department spent large sums of money on launching her and then hauling her out of the water. Howard further explained that he had corresponded with Bibb while in Washington, and that he "considered such the intentions of the department." [fn 25]

Walker immediately wrote back to Howard that "You have repeatedly been instructed in the most positive manner, by written order, and verbally by Captain Fraser as Head of the Bureau, that the mode of propulsion must not be changed until the vessel had been tried on the Hunter plan." He added that "The removing of wheels and planking up the vessel was a high-handed act, without the least shadow of authority which I must look upon as an assumption approved on your part which you must never repeat." Walker listed the written orders of five different dates which had detailed the department’s stance. He ordered McLane to be launched without delay and withdrew Howard from overseeing Spencer so he could give his complete attention to Bibb. [fn 26]

Howard had also expressed his views that Bibb should be altered, but Secretary Walker would not permit any alterations until Hunter had a chance to test her. Launching Bibb on 10 April 1845, Howard continued attacking Hunter’s mode of propulsion. On 8 May, the department relieved Howard of command and ordered Captain Winslow Foster to Bibb to ensure a fair trial. The order "was not obeyed" by Foster because the steamer was not ready, and Howard remained in command. Lieutenant Hunter prepared Bibb for trial and, satisfied with the engines, took her down river on 24 June. [fn 27]

The trial was a farce. The pressure in the boilers, which were designed for sixty pounds, could not be maintained, was never raised over forty pounds, and fell as low as ten. Bibb developed a major leak and, with five feet of water in the hold, had to be hauled on a beach to prevent sinking. An examination showed that the packing around the starboard wheel shaft was entirely gone. On her trip, she had run about seven knots with the current. [fn 28] After this failure, Howard towed Bibb to Cincinnati. Under the pretense that low water levels made it necessary to keep her there, he had her changed to side-wheel propulsion.

Hunter claimed that "without any authorization from the department, [Howard] took out Hunter’s propellers and substituted side wheels" on Bibb. But no evidence substantiates Hunter’s claim. On the contrary, in October Walker instructed Howard that the openings in her sides were to be filled in without disturbing the wheel casings. [fn 29]

Before the Treasury Department discovered the numerous flaws of these six faulty steamers, it began to look into the possibility of building two side-wheel steamers using proven technology. The need for these vessels was immediate. The Revenue Cutter Service had been tasked to protect timber under an act of Congress in 1822. For twenty years, thieves in Louisiana and Florida had been stealing live oak and cedar timber. During the fall of 1844, Naval Constructor Samuel Humphreys and Fraser discussed building a shallow-draft, iron-hulled, two hundred-ton sail-and-steam revenue cutter for inland navigation. [fn 30] The department eventually built two vessels, but of much larger dimensions — too large to be used in the inland waterways. Contracts were let in December 1844 and January 1845. Unfortunately, building these steamers would only compound the department’s mistakes.

Because of the problems with the first three Hunter’s wheel vessels, the department suspended work on Dallas in November 1844 until it could determine if the mode of propulsion and hull form should be changed. Dallas, being built at Buffalo, was destined for service on the Great Lakes. The supervising officer, First Lieutenant Douglas Ottinger, had served on the lakes and on Legare. In his opinion, Dallas drew too much water and had a high center of gravity. Ottinger thought side wheels would be much better suited for use on the lakes. But Secretary Walker insisted that Dallas be completed according to the original plans, Ottinger’s suggestions notwithstanding. Alterations costing $10,000 were already under consideration. These included adding a stuffing box on the shaft, strengthening the arms of the paddle wheel, and adding false sides or blisters to give the vessel added stability. [fn 31]

The department delayed making any decision on Dallas until a conversion of two of Hunter’s other failures, Spencer and McLane, was complete. The McLane was to be converted to a side-wheeler, and Spencer would be fitted with two Loper propellers. Invented by Captain Richard L. Loper, a Philadelphia shipbuilder and shipping magnate, these propellers later became extremely popular on other steamships. They were less complicated than Ericsson’s and had proved to be reliable. Cogged gears were added to the power trains of both vessels to speed up and transform the motion into different directions than had been intended originally. Both ships had two high-pressure noncondensing horizontal engines, twenty-four-inch cylinders, a three-foot stroke, and a boiler with just under fifteen hundred square feet of heating surface. Spencer’s propellers each had four blades eight feet in diameter that made one and one-fourth revolutions for each revolution of the engine. McLane’s side wheels were sixteen and one-half feet in diameter with fourteen buckets on each wheel and made sixty-five revolutions for each hundred of the engine. [fn 32]

In February, Secretary Bibb ordered Howard to superintend the conversion program and to oversee the alteration of Spencer, the first twin-screw iron steamer in government service. The trials, to determine differences of speed, fuel consumption and other qualities, were delayed several times due to mechanical problems. The first trial of Spencer occurred on 22 May, but leaking boilers and wheel casings and loose joints around the keel caused so many problems that Fraser hauled her on the ways on 28 May. [fn 33] On 30 May, trials were again held on board Spencer to determine the success of the conversion, and she steamed at nearly nine knots.

Spencer’s conversion did not solve her myriad problems. The machinery was amidships but the propellers were in the stern of the vessel, making it necessary to install shafts of great length to reach from the midships engine room to the stern. Six bearings supported the shaft, which increased friction and decreased efficiency. The engine room was too small, but still occupied fifty feet of the vessel. Even with the removal of the captain’s quarters to the spar deck, this still allowed only six days’ fuel to be carried. The boilers continued to foam, the engines could burn one ton of coal an hour, and the temperature in the engine room frequently reached 130°. For six months the officers adjusted her machinery and fought leaking boilers in an attempt to make her functional. On a positive note, the Loper propellers proved to be much better than Hunter’s wheels. They did three times more work with 60 percent of the power and were over four-and-a-half times more efficient using fewer revolutions and less boiler pressure. [fn 34]

The side-wheel steamer McLane also had numerous problems. Under the command of Revenue Captain Henry Hunter, she could make nearly eight knots but the boilers could not maintain forty pounds of steam and usually could carry only twenty to twenty-five pounds. Moreover, the exhausted steam flowed into the wheel housings and streamed along the deck. This made navigation difficult by preventing the helmsmen from seeing the length of the vessel. [fn 35]

In April 1846, the service held four trials between Spencer and McLane in Long Island Sound. Some felt that the trials were more confusing than enlightening. They did confirm that McLane’s engines with side-wheel propulsion were 50 percent more efficient than Spencer’s with Loper propellers. They also demonstrated that neither vessel sailed well under canvas and, according to Alexander Fraser, "clearly exhibit to practical men; that, speed under steam, or stability under canvas, are unattainable objects." [fn 36]

With steamers that burned fuel so rapidly, the Revenue Marine now faced a new logistical challenge. The Service established coaling depots at the major cities but had problems keeping them supplied. The depots frequently ran out of coal, and many times the captains substituted wood as fuel. Anthracite coal was best adapted for the steamers, but bituminous was also used. Some of the depots did not accommodate steamers with deep drafts. In Boston it took days to coal a cutter because she could not remain at the wharf longer than two and one-half hours at each tide due to the shallow water there. [fn 37] The great quantity of fuel that these vessels consumed made it difficult to keep their bunkers filled.

The department instructed all captains to use canvas as much as possible to economize on fuel. Steam was to be used in cases of emergency and when absolutely necessary. These instructions were rarely followed. Captain Henry B. Nones was reprimanded by Secretary Bibb for his "use of steam in nearly every movement of the Legare." This practice worsened the logistical problems and compromised the vessels’ sailing qualities, since most of the coal was stored at either end and above the waterline. Using great amounts of coal altered their trim quickly, making it necessary to replenish coal supplies frequently to keep the cutters stable. [fn 38]

Shortly after the trials of Spencer and McLane, the United States declared war on Mexico. On 19 May 1845, Secretary Walker ordered that the Revenue Marine protect the Gulf Coast. Eleven cutters sailed to rendezvous in New Orleans. In mid-May, both Spencer and McLane loaded with stores and ammunition and proceeded to sea. Spencer steamed to Charleston, but her boilers failed three days out of that port, and she had to return. After cooling the boiler, Captain Caleb Currin found that it could not be repaired. Therefore, on 24 July, Spencer set sail for Philadelphia. [fn 39]

McLane, commanded by Howard, set sail on 27 May for the Gulf Coast. Her boilers were nearly useless, and she could make only two-and-one-half to three knots per hour. On the way south, Howard stopped in North Carolina to make repairs and wrote to Walker to apprise him of the difficulties. Walker, seething from all the problems associated with these steamers, responded:

Experience has long since convinced this department of the entire failure of these vessels to meet its reasonable expectations. Expectations founded chiefly on your own assurances and representations before their construction was commenced. . . . Having therefore been mainly instrumental in inducing the adoption of plans, in which all rules of Naval Architecture as well as mechanics are denied, it is but just that the opportunity should be afforded to you to realize by practical experience the lasting injury which has thus been inflicted upon the service as well as the injustice which has been done to the Government. [fn 40]

After making repairs, McLane limped south and arrived at Belize on 5 June. A week later, she went to New Orleans for boiler repairs. It took her over forty hours under constant steam to get there, and after the trip, Howard wrote that McLane would be of no use except "as a (floating) battery." In this condition she was virtually useless to the Navy and could not even carry troops. Her draft precluded her from all harbors west of New Orleans except Galveston. During her Mexican service she never averaged over five knots, and Howard commented that, lacking power, if she were caught on a lee shore in an ordinary gale of wind, she "must... go ashore." For several months McLane lay moored in the river in the Gulf of Campeche near Frontera due to defects in her machinery, where she could not “have escaped had an attack been made." McLane operated in a crippled state with the Navy until December 1847, when Howard was directed to take her to New Orleans to be dismantled. [fn 41]

Legare, in Charleston when the war began, was ordered to the Gulf of Mexico to cooperate with the Navy. She had been the most successful steamer to date, although she had also experienced numerous problems. Her boiler had never been sufficient, and she had received a forced draft blower to help increase steam. In October 1844 she steamed to Key West, but in less than six months her engine and boiler needed extensive repairs. The boiler leaked five hundred gallons an hour, and Captain Henry Nones kept her anchored most of the time until June 1845, when she was ordered to Philadelphia for repairs. Here her Ericsson propellers were exchanged for Loper’s propellers. [fn 42]

Legare steamed back to the Gulf and arrived on 7 August 1846. She immediately developed a leak. Captain Napoleon Coste requested that either the engine be repaired or the propeller be taken off because, when inoperable, its drag made him fear for the safety of the vessel. The Navy used Legare, carrying one long 18-pounder and several smaller guns, as a dispatch boat during the war. After only two months of service, the leaks in her boiler could no longer be caulked. Her further use was "dangerous," and she was ordered back to Norfolk. [fn 43]

At the outbreak of war, the two side-wheel vessels were nearing completion. Polk, built in Richmond, was a side-wheel steamer of about four hundred tons. Over two years had passed since the laying of her keel, and Secretary of the Treasury Walker was anxious that she be completed. In December 1846, Revenue Captain Henry Hunter, who supervised her construction, claimed that she would be ready in February. The delays caused "much surprise" for Walker, who thought her nearly ready for sea. Hunter blamed the delay on the weather, the lack of coppersmiths to work on the engines, and the Christmas holidays. During the months of January and February, over eighty mechanics were employed getting Polk ready for sea. [fn 44]

Polk was finally turned over to the Navy in mid-March 1847, Lieutenant William S$. Ogden commanding. On 31 March, Polk stood out to sea but leaked so badly on the trip to the Gulf of Mexico that she anchored at Ocracoke Inlet. Finding the sponsons under her guard had not been properly fastened, Ogden took Polk back to Norfolk, and in May the Navy returned her to the Treasury Department. [fn 45]

Because of the delay in getting Polk ready, the converted steamer Bibb, already at New Orleans, was substituted for Polk. The alterations to Bibb had taken over one year due to the harsh winter in Cincinnati. Launched in November 1846, Bibb traveled to New Orleans in late December, making over eight knots during the trip. Like McLane, she carried four 32-pounders and one or two 18-pound pivot guns. Her added armament and ammunition, however, made her a crank ship. Her deeper draft forced her iron guards further toward the waterline, which interfered with the dead water coming from the paddles and impeded her speed. She lasted in service for four months and went back to Boston. Captain Winslow Foster commented about Bibb "that never a vessel left port so badly qualified to encounter a sea." He added that "This might have been a good useful vessel, of fair speed, had any nautical skill been employed, when she had prepared for the change in her propulsion... ." [fn 46]

The last of the original Hunter wheel vessels to be completed was Dallas. Built in Buffalo, she was not finished for over two years after the signing of the contract because, in mid-construction, the department considered it wise to change the vessel to side-wheel propulsion. Launched on 4 April 1846 and ready for trial by August, she suffered maladies similar to the other steamers — among them insufficient steam pressure and obstructed vision for the helmsman. By October 1846 some of the imperfections had been corrected, and on a cruise to Detroit she made nearly eight knots. [fn 47]

With most of the steamers now complete, the Revenue Marine began to face the grim reality that none of them would be useful. In early April 1847, Legare was surveyed for a possible three-month cruise along the East Coast. The surveying officers found her machinery so defective that they determined that the only way she could be made serviceable was to replace it. Ericsson helped to make a few changes and tested her in October in order to turn the steamer over to the Coast Survey on 12 November. [fn 48] She served for ten years with the Coast Survey and later, after conversion, as a lightship at Pass Mary Ann in the Gulf of Mexico.

Ericsson’s other vessel, Jefferson, never played any important role for the cutter service. Contracted in January 1845, her construction was delayed due to alterations and mismanagement by Howard. The service made preliminary trials in April 1845. After reaching speeds of ten knots, Howard concluded that she was "without doubt very superior to any vessel" on the Great Lakes. Both of the Ericsson ships had problems with propellers breaking in the center, and in September 1845 Jefferson’s prop, like Legare’s, was replaced with a Loper propeller. The next month the department laid up Jefferson in Oswego for the winter. Jefferson served the rest of her career on the Great Lakes, being laid up each winter until November 1848, when she traveled to New York for alterations to her engine in preparation for her transfer to the Coast Survey in June 1849. [fn 49]

The Hunter wheel vessels also found their way into obsolescence and then into other service. Dallas was conveyed to the Coast Survey but was never put into service. She was later sold for $5,264 and refitted by a private owner. The McLane, which may have cost a total of $220,000, was advertised for sale for an entire month in New Orleans and the department received only one bid for $3,000. To serve the government’s interests better, she was transferred to the Lighthouse Service and was converted into a lightship for Merrill’s Shell Bank, Mississippi, where she remained until 1859. Spencer also became a lightship at Willoughby’s Spit in the Chesapeake. Bibb, like Legare, was transferred to the Coast Survey and served many years with that agency. [fn 50]

The side-wheel vessels, Polk and Walker, built with tested and tried technology, had a shorter period of service than the Hunter wheel ships. Walker was delayed from the beginning due to difficulty in obtaining iron from the mill and bad weather. Disagreements with the builders and faulty drawings continued to delay her progress, and in September 1847, Secretary Walker "deferred the launching ... until further orders ... ." [fn 51] She was finally launched in November, and her captain proclaimed her “the finest iron vessel ever built in this country." Once completed and her engines tested, she steamed down river to New Orleans to be turned over to the Coast Survey. [fn 52]

Polk’s problems were never solved. After attempting adjustments, the department found no workable solution and decided to convert her into a sailing bark. The building of Polk had likely cost the government over $200,000. It would have cost at least $25,000 more to make her an efficient steamer, whereas it cost only $4,000 to transform her into a sailing vessel. As a measure of thrift, her machinery was transferred to Jefferson and the spars and stores of Jefferson and Dallas were used to outfit Polk. [fn 53] Polk served on the West Coast until 1854.

The Revenue Cutter Service made virtually every mistake that could have been made in its first steam building program. The Hunter wheel was a technological anomaly which the bureau adopted too quickly. The designers of the steamers attempted to utilize a combination of sail and steam propulsion, with the final product being a combination of the bad qualities of each. None of the ships had enough power with either mode of propulsion to be effective revenue vessels. The numerous problems indicate that they had not been designed by practical seamen or practical engineers.

The design of the hulls for the Hunter wheel steamers aggravated their problem further. The inverted bell-shaped hull had little structural strength and compromised the ship’s stability and sailing qualities. The arrangements for coal stowage further aggravated the stability problem. The engine rooms were extremely large and lay in the middle of the ships, which caused problems in masting them. They were all crank and unstable under sail. [fn 54]

The engines were experimental in nature and had never been tested before being purchased. Screw-propelled vessels required engines producing higher revolutions to turn the shaft at high speeds. Seagoing side-wheel vessels of the day used fifteen pounds of steam pressure and turned at twenty revolutions per minute. Ericsson’s engines used high-pressure steam designed to turn the propeller at forty to fifty revolutions per minute with forty pounds of steam. This pressure was too high. for the low-pressure boilers, causing them to foam and blow out packing when attempts were made to keep up the steam pressure that the engines required. The high shaft speeds caused bearings to run hot, and lubricants, not yet designed for these speeds, broke down. The lack of steam caused the engines to run fast until the steam ran out and then slowly while waiting for steam to build to the proper pressure once again. This lack of working pressure was aggravated by the fact that the piston stroke was about half the length of most contemporary steam engines, which caused a greater waste of steam at the end of the cylinder. The attempt to increase the revolutions with cogged gearing in the converted Hunter wheel vessels admitted the problem of vibration and caused a rapid wear-and-tear on wooden and iron gears. At each stroke of the engine, the iron plates sprung two inches. These leaks were hard to find and difficult to repair if found, due to the poor quality and thinness of the iron plates. [fn 55]

Both modes of propulsion were novel and unreliable. Ericsson’s propellers were overly complicated for this period. Two propellers on one shaft that counter-rotated were ahead of their time. They also put excess strain on the shafts of the steamers. Hunter’s wheels were even more of an anomaly. Everyone failed to take into account the inefficient nature of the Hunter wheel, where as much as 50 to 70 percent of the propulsion power was lost pushing the water around the wheel wells. [fn 56]

The cost of the steamers far exceeded all expectations. There were several reasons for this. Some of the contracts were made without competition and were so "vaguely executed" that the government was not protected from fraud or other abuses. Howard’s extravagant tastes, lack of economy, and poor management of the accounts compounded the problems. Howard’s superiors reprimanded him often for his expenditures and threatened to reject his accounts. In April 1845, the department received a bill for Moroccan leather seats for the boats on Bibb and silk linings for the bookcases. Walker wrote Howard that he was putting a stop to the lavish spending, and that, if the claim was "authentic," Howard would be required to pay the bill. [fn 57] The department perhaps expected too much of Howard, who had to travel between the different building sites and could never give the time necessary to oversee all the vessels. With no clerical help, Howard had to deal with different ships and contractors in cities hundreds of miles apart, and his poor managerial abilities were never adequate for such a complicated project.

Before building commenced, the estimated cost for these vessels was less than $50,000 each. Costs soared quickly asthe dimensions increased. The weight of the vessels had been underestimated, and the eventual cost for the steamers and the conversions was about $2 million at the time when the budget of the service was only $500,000 a year. Much of the cost of the steamers can be attributed to changes that were attempted in order to make them useable. In 1845 the service used 60 percent of its appropriations to pay for the contracts of these steamers. This lack of thrift caused Congress to prohibit the Treasury Department to build or purchase cutters without Congressional approval. [fn 58]

The Revenue Marine risked a great deal on these steamers. They lasted only about three years, most of the time in an unusable condition, which was completely contrary to their intended lengthy service. The building program crippled the Revenue Marine in two ways: First, it dominated spending during the years immediately following the construction of the vessels. Second, the steamers, which comprised nearly one-third of the fleet in 1846, were out of service by 1849. That void forced the department to build seven new cutters in 1848, which further strained the budget. Moreover, the Treasury Department became so embarrassed and distrustful of steamers that it did not build another steam vessel for a dozen years.

Table 1: Early Steam Vessels of the Revenue Marine

While the Revenue Service lost a great deal, the Light House Service and the Coast Survey both benefited from these failures. The Light House Service received two lightships, while the Coast Survey obtained four steamers, all at no cost. This caused one contemporary observer to state that the enormous expenditures were "cast upon" the Revenue Service, whose officers had opposed the steam vessels from the beginning. He observed that naval officers interested in the Coast Survey had favored these steamers all along and had “laid the egg for the Revenue Marine to hatch," unjustly leaving the latter to "father the deformed offspring." [fn 59] These vessels, built with unproven technology, truly proved to be a "lasting injury" to the Revenue Service and to the government.

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